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V I. POSTSCRIPT ......................................................... 99 1
All of us can think of a book.., that we hope none of our children or
any other children have taken off the shelf But if I have the right to
remove that book from the shelf-that work I abhor-then you also
have exactly the same right and so does everyone else. And then we
have no books left on the shelf for any of us.
-Katherine Paterson, American author of children's books
(1932-)1
I. INTRODUCTION
Though hardly a new battle,2 the tug-of-war between public-school-
board decision-making and the First Amendment has received increasing
legal attention over the past thirty years, particularly in the context of
school board authority and discretion in the selection and removal of
books.3 Although courts across the country faced no dearth of contro-
versy pertaining to the appropriate level of control in public-school
libraries,4 the Supreme Court declined to address the scope of book
1. Goodreads.com, Quotes by Katherine Paterson, http://www.goodreads.com/authorI
quotes/J949.KatherinePaterson (last visited May 13, 2009).
2. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that wearing armbands on school premises as a form of expression is constitutionally
protected by the First Amendment, and school officials may neither prohibit nor punish such
activity absent a demonstration of "substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (finding Arkansas's anti-evolution
statutes contrary to First Amendment freedom of religion protections); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compulsion of flag salute and pledge by
school officials violates First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion).
3. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
872 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[L]ocal school boards may not remove books from school library
shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books .... "); Chiras v. Miller,
432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that because selection of textbooks for public school
curriculum is a form of government speech, school board officials are afforded broad discretion in
their decisions and the First Amendment creates no right to be asserted by textbook authors);
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 1972)
(upholding a school board's removal of a public school library book on the grounds that authority
for the selection of books statutorily lies with the school board and review by the court for such
selection or removal is thus inappropriate); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade
County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (ordering
defendant school board to return removed library book series after determining that such removal
was likely based on board members' distaste of the ideas contained in one book belonging to the
series); Kelsey Menzel, Comment, Board of Education v. Pico: School Library Book Removal and
the First Amendment, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1063, 1064 (1983) ("Before the 1960's, freedom of
religion was the only first amendment concern to receive significant judicial consideration within
the public school environment.").
4. See infra Part II.
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removals by school officials5 until the landmark case of Board of Educa-
tion, Island Trees Union Free School District, No. 26 v. Pico.6 After
identifying public-school libraries as having a "unique role,"7 and thus
deserving greater First Amendment protection, the Court held that "local
school boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books."8 Though hand-
ing down a decision with loaded language and powerful implications,
the failure of the Court to establish a majority opinion has left lower
courts questioning Pico's precedential value.9
While Pico's splintered opinion leaves the door open for trial and
appellate courts to essentially model their own interpretations of the con-
stitutional limits on school board authority to remove library books,' °
the plurality's analysis has so far been upheld and applied in subsequent
book-banning cases. 1 In 2006, however, the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida encountered its own book removal contro-
versy in American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade
County School Board 2 (Vamos a Cuba). The polemical issue in South
Florida began when the daughter of a former Cuban political prisoner
brought home i Vamos a Cuba!, a book in an elementary travel series
that she had checked out from her public-school library.13 Finding the
book offensive, her father lodged a formal complaint with the Miami-
Dade School Board requesting the book's permanent removal from the
"total school environment" because, "as a former political prisoner from
Cuba," he found its material was "untruthful" and "portray[ed] a life in
5. See, e.g., Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S. 998 (1972)
(denying certiorari for appeal concerning school board's removal of a public school library book).
6. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
7. Id. at 869.
8. Id. at 872.
9. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1995)
("Even though the constitutional analysis in the Pico plurality opinion does not constitute binding
precedent, it may properly serve as guidance ...."); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F.
Supp. 864, 875 (D. Kan. 1995) ("The plurality decision in Pico is not binding precedent.").
10. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds ....' (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
11. See Campbell, 64 F.3d at 191 (applying Pico and remanding for development of factual
record to determine whether removal was unconstitutionally motivated); Case, 908 F. Supp. at
875 ("[T]he court concludes that it should follow the Pico decision in analyzing the Olathe School
District's removal of Annie on My Mind from the District's libraries."). As previously noted, just
prior to publication of this Note, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the Vamos a Cuba case, supposedly
applying a Pico analysis, but reaching a conclusion contrary to that reached in Campbell and
Case.
12. 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2006), vacated, 557 F.3d 1177 (1 1th Cir. 2009).
13. Id. at 1247.
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Cuba that does not exist."' 4 After engaging in behavior deviating from
normal school procedure for handling contested library books, the
school board disregarded the recommendations of its two designated
committees and superintendent, and permanently banned not only that
particular book from that particular library, but also banned all books in
the series from all of the libraries in the district.15 Although board mem-
bers alleged the books were removed based on inaccuracy, the decision
smacked of pretextual justification used to cover up the fact that the
board disagreed with perceived political implications of the text.
16
Following the growing trend in post-Pico litigation, the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida applied the Pico plurality's
reasoning and ordered the defendant school board to replace the library
books it had removed, finding that the motivations compelling such
action had failed to pass constitutional muster.17 The unhappy school
board subsequently appealed, and the still-pending case marks the Elev-
enth Circuit's first chance to "directly address and apply"18 Pico's
framework. With the highly political and hotly contested' 9 Vamos a
Cuba case sitting on its docket, the Eleventh Circuit finds itself at an
important juncture in First Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to
school board control in the realm of public-school libraries. The court's
determination in this case will either continue the trend of solidifying
Pico as precedent, or it will carve out a pretextual loophole for Eleventh
Circuit school boards to remove books at will without critical examina-
tion of the role of masked motivations.
This Note seeks to review the constitutional background and prior
relevant case law that presently shapes the field of First Amendment
rights in public-school libraries and argues that (1) Pico is the appropri-
ate standard to be applied to the Vamos a Cuba case, (2) the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida correctly employed the Pico
analysis and reached the only just conclusion, and (3) the Eleventh Cir-
cuit should affirm this conclusion on appeal. Part II of this Note will (1)
present the constitutional framework governing children's rights in pub-
lic schools and the extent to which those rights may be truncated by
school boards, (2) discuss the unique dual role of the public-school
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1257.
16. Id. at 1251-60.
17. Id. at 1294.
18. Id. at 1270.
19. See, e.g., Rob Jordan, Commie Book Ban: Vamos a Cuba Has Become an Unlikely
Political Lightening Rod, MIAMI NEw TiMEs, Aug. 10, 2006, available at http://
www.miaminewtimes.com2006-08-10/news/comfie-book-ban; Carol J. Williams, Schools Told
To Reinstate Banned Cuba Book, L.A. TiMEs, July 25, 2006, at A12.
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library and how this dual role affects the constitutional treatment and
protections of decisions pertaining to rights within the library environ-
ment, and (3) culminate with a detailed account of the rise in library
book removal litigation prior to the Supreme Court decision in Pico and
demonstrate the importance of factual background in the outcome of
book banning cases. Part III of this Note will canvass the Supreme
Court's landmark book removal decision, Board of Education, Island
Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico and its progeny. Part IV
will discuss the presently pending Vamos a Cuba case, beginning with a
presentation of the facts and holding and concluding with an analysis
answering the questions of whether Pico is the appropriate standard to
be applied, whether the district court reached the proper conclusion, and
how the Eleventh Circuit should rule.
II. THE RISE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY LITIGATION:
PRE-Pco BOOK REMOVAL CHALLENGES
A. Background
The Supreme Court has long recognized public education's central
role in society and the "importance of public schools in the preparation
of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the
values on which our society rests, '"20 as well as the duty of such schools
to "inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system."'" Thus, the Court has affirmed that "by
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities,"2 2 and that courts will neither question nor
interfere with this control, nor resolve any "conflicts which arise in the
daily operation of school systems."23 Notwithstanding this deference,
however, the Supreme Court also recognizes that children retain consti-
tutional rights and "the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools,"24
where students do not "shed their [First Amendment] constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate." 5 School officials are, nevertheless,
generally afforded broad discretion over curricular decisions 26 and may,
20. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
21. Id. at 77.
22. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) ("No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils ... .
23. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104.
24. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
26. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) ("Nor has challenge been made of
the state's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports."); Chiras v. Miller,
2009]
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to an extent, place legitimate limitations on matters that "students, par-
ents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school."27 While subject to limitation within the
school context, children's constitutional rights may not be completely
eviscerated and decisions "directly and sharply implicat[ing] basic con-
stitutional values"28 will be rendered impermissible. The public-school
library, however, creates somewhat of a constitutional conundrum due to
the fact that it has historically been considered a separate sphere with
respect to the scope of curricular and educational influence.29 Examining
the origin of public-school libraries and the struggle to develop a unique
identity separate from that of their corresponding schools, Robert J.
Peltz quotes guidance given by Melvil Dewey-former state librarian of
New York-to the American Library Association and the National Edu-
432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that because selection of textbooks for public school
curriculum is a form of government speech, school board officials are afforded broad discretion in
their decisions and the First Amendment creates no right to be asserted by textbook authors);
Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1029, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1998)
(upholding school district's assignment of and refusal to remove particular books from its
curriculum on the grounds that plaintiff's request "significantly interfere[s] with the District's
discretion to determine the composition of its curriculum," and rejecting "the notion that putting
books on trial in our courts is the proper way to determine the appropriateness of their use in the
classroom" because "[s]uch judgments are ordinarily best left to school boards and educational
officials charged with educating young people and determining which education materials are
appropriate for which students, and under what circumstances."); Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia
County, 862 F.2d 1517, 1525 (11 th Cir. 1989) (upholding school board's decision to remove a
portion of a humanities textbook from the curriculum based on vulgarity and sexual explicitness).
27. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). Hazelwood concerned the
removal of two pages from a high school newspaper prior to its publication. School officials
removed the two pages containing articles regarding students' experiences with pregnancy and
parental divorce on the grounds that such content was inappropriate for younger students at the
school and violated the privacy of parents mentioned in the divorce article. Id. at 262-63. Upon
finding that the newspaper was produced by journalism classes as part of the educational
curriculum, Justice White fashioned the "imprimatur of the school" test and, upon its application,
concluded that the school board had not overstepped its First Amendment boundaries in removing
the two articles. Id. at 271-76. If the imprimatur of the school can reasonably be perceived, such
materials "may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur
in a traditional classroom setting," and "[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control ... to
assure.., that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school." Id.
at 271. Under the "imprimatur of the school" test, the exercise of broad discretionary censorship
by school boards is consistent with First Amendment protections, so long as the actions taken are
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 273. For other cases permitting
school board censorship based on the "imprimatur" test, see, for example, Bannon v. School
District of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1220 (11 th Cir. 2004), applying Hazelwood and
upholding a school district's compelled removal of religious icons from murals painted for a
school beautification project, and Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 228 F.3d 1003,
1016-17 (9th Cir. 2000), applying Hazelwood and upholding a school district's refusal to allow a
teacher to post gay-and-lesbian-awareness-month materials on school bulletin boards.
28. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 105.
29. See Richard J. Peltz, Pieces of Pico: Saving Intellectual Freedom in the Public School
Library, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 103, 108-27 (2005).
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cation Association for the proper concept of the public school library in
the late nineteenth century, emphasizing that "the school library would
remain primarily a library and not . . . be subsumed, and thus sub-
verted"3 by the school's curriculum and educational duties:
We can not do too much in bringing libraries and schools into the
closest harmony and co-operation, but they should be co-workers
each keeping its proper field and giving the co-operation and respect
due to its associate, and not drifting into the traditional relation of the
lion and the lamb that lie down together, with the lamb inside the
lion.3'
Given this "dual identity"32 of curricular-but-non-curricular, confu-
sion over the scope of control hardly surprised courts hearing constitu-
tional claims regarding the exercise of censorship by school officials.
Predictably, when confronted with the 1972 to 1982 influx of book
removal litigation, trial and appellate courts struggled with the appropri-
ate balance between traditional state authority over public-school deci-
sion-making and First Amendment rights in the spherically separate
school-library setting. However, while judges across the country seemed
to contradict one another each time a new case was adjudicated, their
rulings were in fact more closely aligned than they appeared: Removals
based on obscene or offensive conduct were generally upheld, while
removals with suspicious justifications were generally overturned. More
importantly, each decision weighed heavily on the factual background
accompanying the constitutional claims, making every holding some-
what unpredictable, as new factual scenarios could easily massage the
prior ruling into a new standard unique to the instant case. Given this
flexible and fact-dependent nature of the book removal cases and corre-
sponding holdings, the remainder of Part II describes pre-Pico removal
cases in detail, as such details in this context are what make cases simi-
lar or dissimilar, and thus make prior holdings more or less applicable.
B. Pre-Pico Removals Based on Obscene and Offensive Content
When presented with factual patterns suggesting removal of materi-
als because of perceived obscene or offensive content, four courts
applied a highly deferential analysis of book banning, refusing to inter-
vene in ordinary school matters. Of these four, only one court contra-
vened the school board's decision, finding that the factual background
suggested that the board acted unreasonably.
30. Id. at 115.
31. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
32. Id. at 121.
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1. PRESIDENTS COUNCIL, DISTRICT 25 V. COMMUNITY
SCHOOL BOARD NO. 25
The Second Circuit commenced the decade-long wave of library
litigation in 1972 when it reviewed Presidents Council, District 25 v.
Community School Board No. 25.1' In Presidents Council, a group of
students and parents, along with others, brought a suit contesting the
school board's removal of a particular book from all junior high school
libraries in the district because of the graphically detailed "acts of crimi-
nal violence, sex, normal and perverse, as well as episodes of drug
shooting. '34 After the suit was filed, the board held a public meeting and
subsequently passed a resolution permitting the book to remain at those
libraries that had already acquired it, but making it available only on
direct loan to permission-granting parents. 35 Litigation continued, how-
ever, and the circuit court ruled in favor of school officials, finding that
since by statute New York had "determined that the responsibility for
the selection of materials in the public school libraries ... is to be vested
in the Community School Board,"' 36 it was inappropriate for the Court to
review "either the wisdom or the efficacy of the[ir] determinations."37
Furthermore, it concluded, the plaintiffs suffered "no impingement upon
any basic constitutional value, 38 and "the administration of any library
... involves a constant process of selection and winnowing. ' 39 Although
the Second Circuit's ruling was appealed by the student-plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, declining to address the issues of stu-
dents' public-school library First Amendment rights.4"
2. ZYKAN V. WARSAW COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION
In 1980, high school students in the Seventh Circuit brought a First
33. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 290-91.
35. Id. at 290.
36. Id. at 291.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 293.
40. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S. 998, 998 (1972). Justice
Douglas dissented, seemingly perturbed over the extent of school board authority allocated in
determining the rights of students. Supporting a grant of certiorari, Douglas argued:
The First Amendment is a preferred right and is of great importance in the
schools.... What else can the School Board now decide it does not like? How else
will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending children to school to be educated
by the norms of the School Board or are we educating our youth to shed the
prejudices of the past, to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our
world's problems? ... Because the issues raised here are crucial to our national life,
I would hear argument in this case.
Id. at 999-1000 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment suit alleging that the Warsaw School Board's decision to
permanently remove a library book "stemmed from their social, political
and moral tastes and not from educational criteria."4 Echoing the Sec-
ond Circuit's rationale in Presidents Council, the Seventh Circuit also
found that students lacked a viable constitutional claim in Zykan v. War-
saw Community School Corporation.42 Carefully denoting that the rul-
ing was "not to say that an administrator may remove a book from the
library as part of a purge of all material offensive to a single, exclusive
perception of the way of the world,"43 the Seventh Circuit determined
that "no such allegations appear[ed] in plaintiffs' pleading."' Although
the plaintiffs contended that the board's decision was based on "particu-
lar words in the books [that] offended their social, political, and moral
tastes,"45 the court found that this did not bolster their cause of action
because "it is in general permissible and appropriate for local boards to
make educational decisions based upon their personal social, political
and moral views. '"46 The court further instructed that "nothing in the
Constitution permits the courts to interfere with local educational discre-
tion until local authorities begin to substitute rigid and exclusive indoc-
trination for the mere exercise of their prerogative to make pedagogic
choices regarding matters of legitimate dispute."47
3. BICKNELL V. VERGENNES UNION HIGH SCHOOL BOARD
OF DIRECTORS
That same year, the Second Circuit again condoned the removal of
library materials on the basis of obscene or vulgar content in Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors.48 After the school
board removed two books on account of the "vulgarity and indecency of
language used,"49 students brought a First Amendment suit, claiming
that their rights had been violated "primarily because the Board's action
was motivated solely by the 'personal tastes and values' of the Board
members."5 ° Once establishing that there was "no suggestion that the
books were complained about or removed because of their ideas, nor
that the Board members acted because of political motivation,"5 the
41. Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980).
42. Id. at 1304.
43. Id. at 1308.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1302.
46. Id. at 1305.
47. Id. at 1306.
48. 638 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 440.
50. Id. at 441.
51. Id.
2009]
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court ruled in favor of the defendant school board, asserting that "so
long as the materials removed were permissibly considered to be vulgar
or indecent, it is not cause for legal complaint that the board members
applied their own standards of taste about vulgarity." 2
4. SHECK V. BAILEYVILLE SCHOOL COMMITTEE
Finally, just months before Pico was argued before the Supreme
Court, a district court in the First Circuit upheld the general ideology of
Presidents, Zykan, and Bicknell. This time, however, a decision was
made in favor of the plaintiff students.53 While clearly recognizing that
"the state may have a greater responsibility to protect youth from
obscenity,"54 and that the board's removal of the book "could be viewed
as not directly and sharply implicating a basic constitutional right,"55 the
district court was greatly troubled by the fact that the board had banned
the entire book without reading it, particularly when "the social value of
its content is roundly praised and stands unchallenged by the state."56
After concluding that the book had been banned, not for its obscenity,
but rather for "arbitrary official standards of vocabular taste,"57 the court
instructed that all courts should remain on "first-amendment alert in
book-banning cases,"5 8 when the materials in question have been
"merely deemed objectionable on vocabular grounds. ' 59 Granting the
students in Sheck a preliminary injunction against the removal of the
contested books, the court held that "a less vigilant standard would leave
the care of the flock to the fox that is only after their feathers."60
C. Pre-Pico Removals Tainted by Pretextual Ulterior Motives
Although, as evidenced above, decisions based on legitimate con-
cerns of vulgarity or obscenity invoked substantial deference to school
board discretion, courts across the country were less willing to extend
this deference to decisions couched in factually suspicious justifications.
Hence, courts held that public school boards' prerogative in abrogating
children's constitutional rights was not absolute and would not be
upheld where facts sufficiently demonstrated that library book removal
52. Id.
53. Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 693 (D. Me. 1982).
54. Id. at 687.
55. Id. at 684.
56. Id. at 687.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 688.
59. Id. at 687.
60. Id. at 688.
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decisions were tainted by pretextual ulterior motives of the board
members.
1. MINARCINI V. STRONGSVILLE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, the Sixth Circuit
reviewed a case concerning the decision of a school board to not only
remove books from its high-school library, but also prohibit class dis-
cussion of the materials and their use for supplemental reading.6 Ruling
in favor of the suit-bringing students, the Sixth Circuit rooted its holding
in two major concepts. First, opined the court, when a library is estab-
lished in a public school, "it is an important privilege created by the state
for the benefit of the students in the school."62 Having instituted this
privilege, the state may not then withdraw the privilege via "succeeding
school boards whose members might desire to 'winnow' the library
books for the content of which occasioned their displeasure or disap-
proval."63 Second, the court found that should the board wish to "win-
now" library books, its removal will only be sustained if the proffered
reasons for its actions are "neutral in First Amendment terms. 6 4 Unable
to find any First Amendment neutral reasoning for the board's removal
decision in this case, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Strongsville
"School Board removed the books because it found them objectionable
in content and because it felt that it had the power, unfettered by the
First Amendment, to censor the school library for subject matter which
the Board members found distasteful. '65 This, the court held, was
unconstitutional because by establishing the public-school library in the
first place, the school board "created such a privilege for the benefit of
its students," and could not "place conditions on the use of the library
which were solely related to the social or political tastes of the school
board members. ' '66
2. RIGHT TO READ DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF CHELSEA V.
SCHOOL COMMITTEE
While the Minarcini court insinuated ulterior motives for the school
board's action, a district court in the First Circuit encountered a more
factually complex case than had previously been adjudicated.67 In Right
to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School Committee, the parent
61. 541 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 581.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 582.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Right to Read Def. Comm. of Chelsea v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
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of a high-school student called the school board committee chairman
complaining of offensive language in an anthology his daughter had
checked out from the library.68 The chairman, Quigley, assured the par-
ent that the issue would be dealt with and after reading only the specific
poem mentioned in the complaint, concluded that the entire anthology
should be removed from the high-school library.69 Speaking with no one
but the complaining parent prior to his determination, Quigley scheduled
an emergency committee meeting and penned a newspaper editorial that
same night which publicized the instigating event and was circulated the
following day." Quigley did not distribute copies of the book to com-
mittee members until they arrived at the meeting and only allowed the
three male members to review the copies, as he did not think female
members should be exposed to such offensive language and "assumed
that at least two of the women.. . would accept his characterization of
the poem."7
At the meeting, Superintendent McGee was asked to compile and
present a report to the committee regarding the "filthy" and "vile" text.72
McGee agreed, though warned Quigley and the rest of the committee
that "it was inappropriate to handle this complaint in an open school
meeting, and that Quigley was 'setting in motion a chain of events that
might lead to censorship' "73-an opinion Quigley mocked and chastised
in another editorial published the following day."4 After reading the
entire book, McGee imparted his findings at another committee meeting
two days later, informing the members that aside from the poem com-
plained of and a single objectionable word in one other work, there was
"no obscene terminology" and that, in his opinion, the book was "sound
and ha[d] educational value with the exception of the passage objected
to and one other word in one other poem."75 McGee stated that the book
would be temporarily removed to the principal's office, pending a deci-
sion as to whether the entire anthology should be banned or whether
only the offensive pages would be extracted.76 In yet another special
meeting following McGee's recommendations, Quigley, along with a
couple of other members, determined that, even though they had not
read the book, the "low down dirty rotten filth, garbage, fit only for the
68. Id. at 706.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 706-07.
71. Id. at 707.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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sewer" 77 should be permanently banned, despite suggested alterna-
tives-such as requiring parental permission for students under the age
of eighteen. 78 At the same meeting, one committee member suggested
that the board look into "setting up a system of reviewing and acting
upon complaints from parents or others on any books,' 79 but this sug-
gestion was defeated and Quigley's motion to ban the book permanently
was passed.8" McGee, who had not been present at the meeting,
informed the principal shortly thereafter that only the offensive pages
were to be removed and the book returned to the library.8" The principal
removed the pages, but contrary to McGee's instruction, did not return
the book to the library.82 Six days later, students filed a suit alleging
First Amendment violations and requesting injunctive relief.8 3 After
consulting with its attorney, the school board held its last special meet-
ing and adopted a resolution presented and prepared by the attorney
indicating that the text was permanently removed from the library on the
grounds that:
1) [T]he book dealt with "sex education," not a school subject; 2) that
[it] had a potentially unhealthy and counter-productive effect on
some children; and 3) the Committee preferred that even sex educa-
tion books in the library not contain words and phrases considered
"filthy, shocking and obscene by a large section of the community."84
Examining the case, the district court began its reasoning for grant-
ing the plaintiffs injunctive relief with the widespread dogma that "local
authorities are, and must continue to be, the principal policy makers in
the public schools," 5 and that "it is the tension between these necessary
administrative powers and the First Amendment rights of those within
the school system that underlies the conflict in this case."86 The court
retraced the holding of Minarcini and similarly opined that a school
board does not have carte blanche to remove books at its will.8 7 After
reviewing the record, the court found it to leave "no doubt" that the
committee banned the book "because it considered the theme and lan-
guage ... to be offensive."88 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Mt.
77. Id. at 708.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 709.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 710-11.
86. Id. at 711.
87. Id. at 711, 714.
88. Id. at 711.
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Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,89 the judge stipulated that
"the reasons underlying the actions of school officials may determine
their constitutionality,"9 and, in the instant case, it appeared that the
reasons underlying the school board's actions were impermissible and
the committee's adopted resolution legitimizing its banning of the book
was "a self-serving document that rewrote history in an effort to meet
the issues of this litigation. In simple terms, it was a pretext."'" Further-
more, the court asserted, "if this work may be removed by a committee
hostile to its language and theme, then the precedent is set for removal
of any other work. The prospect of successive school committees 'sani-
tizing' the school library of views divergent from their own is alarm-
ing."9 Finding the board's action to have infringed the plaintiffs' First
Amendment protected rights, the book ban was enjoined.93
3. SALVAIL V. NASHUA BOARD OF EDUCATION
Shortly after Right to Read was decided, a district court in the First
Circuit reviewed a book removal case, only this time the cause of action
alleged the wrongful removal of a magazine collection and subsequent
cancellation of the school library's subscription.94 In 1977, the State
Department of Education in New Hampshire circulated guidelines to its
public schools instructing how to appropriately deal with any challenged
library materials. 95 Although such guidelines were concededly advisory,
they were "designed to be applicable to challenges to the material made
by the members of any school board," and provided detailed instructions
89. 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, an untenured teacher brought suit against
his former employer alleging that his contract was not renewed because of a telephone call he
made to a local radio station regarding a school memorandum. In addressing the teacher's alleged
First Amendment infringement, the Court instructed that, despite the fact that "he could have been
discharged for no reason whatsoever, and had no constitutional right to a hearing prior to the
decision not to rehire him," id. at 283, his First Amendment claim was "not defeated by the fact
that the did not have tenure," and "he may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the
decision not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected First
Amendment freedoms," id. at 283-84. Reviewing the district and appellate court opinions, the
Court found that the teacher had carried his burden in demonstrating that his conduct was both
protected under the First Amendment and that it was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
Board's decision, but that "the District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to
respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id. at 287. Determining
that it was unable to ascertain what result the lower courts would have reached had they applied
this standard, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. Id.
90. Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 712.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 714.
93. Id. at 715.
94. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (D.N.H. 1979).
95. Id. at 1270.
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for the formation of a special review committee and the procedures that
the committee should follow in handling a complaint.9 6 Over a period of
several months, one Nashua Board of Education member, Mr. Thomaier,
who "held strong religious and patriotic views as to the types of reading
material that should be available to pupils in a senior high school,"97
expressed increasing concern about a particular magazine that was avail-
able in the library upon request to high-school students.98 At a board
meeting in March of 1978, Thomaier presented a formal resolution to
remove the magazine, attaching as evidence copies of only a few adver-
tisements from one of the issues.9 9 Several of the other board members
suggested that the Department of Education guidelines for procedure be
adhered to, but another member supporting Thomaier asserted that they
"were not bound by these interim guidelines and that 'in some cases they
should act instantaneously.' "10 Thomaier's resolution was passed by a
five-to-three vote and instructed the cancellation of the subscription and
removal of all issues from the library.'0° Plaintiffs subsequently filed
suit alleging that the magazine was neither obscene nor patently offen-
sive and that its removal constituted a First Amendment violation. 0 2 At
the onset of litigation, the board reviewed the removed publications and,
after meeting again, voted to return two issues of the magazine to the
library with the objectionable advertisements excised. 0 3 At this same
meeting, the board also approved the Department of Education's guide-
lines, "which, as worded, were clearly applicable to (any Nashua resi-
dent) and would therefore include any member of the Board."'0 4
In analyzing the factual record, the district court found that "despite
protestations" by the school board, it was "the 'political content' of MS
magazine ... that led to its arbitrary displacement," and "such a basis
for removal of the publication is constitutionally impermissible."' 105 The
court likened the case to Right to Read, indicating that "here, as in Right
to Read ... the publication was banned by the Board without reading it,
the female Board members were 'sheltered' from the alleged improper
material," and "the actions of the Board taken at their meeting . ..
wherein all issues of MS were reviewed and two were returned to the
96. Id. at 1270-71.
97. Id. at 1271.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1272.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1274.
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library shelves [were] pretextual and self-serving." 116 Granting the
injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs, the court ruled that the
defendant school board "failed to demonstrate a substantial and legiti-
mate government interest sufficient to warrant removal" of the magazine
and that the board's action "contravene[d] the plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment rights, and as such it [was] plainly wrong."'10 7
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF PUBLIC-SCHOOL LIBRARY
BOOK BANNING: PICO AND ITS PROGENY
Because the Supreme Court has reviewed only one case pertaining
to the removal of extracurricular school library books and because the
precedential implications of its plurality decision are subject to interpre-
tation, the factual details and rationales supporting its various holdings
are of extraordinary importance in its application to the Vamos a Cuba
case. Likewise, the factual scenarios of the cases following Pico are also
salient, as the facets of these suits suggest how factually similar litiga-
tion should be handled. As such, this part of the Note reviews in detail
Pico and the relevant cases litigated following its decision.
A. Factual Background
In late 1975, members of the Board of Education of the Island
Trees Union Free School District No. 26 attended a conference hosted
by an organization of politically conservative parents troubled by the
educational materials and legislation in the state of New York. °8 At this
conference, a list of "objectionable" and "improper" books was distrib-
uted and, upon returning to Island Trees, the board members discovered
that ten of the listed books were retained in the high school and junior
high school libraries. 0 9 A few months later, the board gave an "unoffi-
cial direction" to the superintendent and principals of the junior high and
high schools to remove the books from the libraries and deliver them to
the offices of the board members so the texts could be read and
reviewed."' The superintendent attempted to remind the board that a
policy designed to handle such issues was already in place and that the
present decision should be "approached through this established channel
.... But the board disregarded the superintendent's advice.""' After the
unofficial direction was carried out, the removals became publicized and
106. Id. at 1275.
107. Id. at 1275-76.
108. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856
(1982).
109. Id. at 856-57.
110. Id. at 857.
111. Id. at 874-75.
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the board justified its actions in a press release, declaring that the
removed books were "'anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic,
and just plain filthy,' and concluded that '[i]t is our duty, our moral
obligation, to protect the children in our schools from this moral danger
as surely as from physical and medical dangers.""' 12 Shortly thereafter,
the board formed a "Book Review Committee" to read the books and
make recommendations about whether or not they should be returned to
the library based on the books' "'educational suitability,' 'good taste,'
'relevance,' and 'appropriateness to age and grade level.' "113 Although
the committee supplied the board with its recommendations, the board
"substantially rejected the Committee's report," and permanently
removed nine of the books from the library and from curricular use,
giving "no reasons for rejecting the recommendations of the Committee
that it had appointed." '114
In response to the board's decision, students filed a suit alleging
that their First Amendment rights had been violated and that board
members had ordered the removal and banned curricular use of the
materials "because particular passages in the books offended their social,
political and moral tastes and not because the books, taken as a whole,
were lacking in educational value.""' 5 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the school board, finding that it had "acted
not on religious principles but on its conservative educational philoso-
phy, and on its belief that the nine books ...were irrelevant, vulgar,
immoral, and in bad taste, making them educationally unsuitable""' 6 for
students at the school. The court instructed that although the removal of
the texts might "reflect a misguided educational philosophy, it does not
constitute a sharp and direct infringement on any first amendment
right.""' 7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision, finding the case to present more than mere infer-
ences of violative action and, given the "Board's erratic and free-
wheeling behavior,"" 8 the plaintiff students were "improperly deprived
of an opportunity to persuade the finder of fact that the proffered justifi-
cations were mere pretext for an intentional violation of plaintiffs'
112. Id. at 857 (alterations in original) (quoting Pico v. Bd, of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), afftd, 457
U.S. 853).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 858.
115. Id. at 858-59.
116. Pico, 474 F. Supp. at 392.
117. Id. at 397.
118. Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404, 416 (2d
Cir. 1980).
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rights."' ' 9 The school board appealed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 12
0
B. Holding and Opinions
Writing for the plurality and joined by Justices Marshall and Ste-
vens, Justice Brennan began his opinion by clarifying that the case "does
not involve textbooks, or indeed any books that Island Trees students
would be required to read .... On the contrary, the only books at issue
in the case are library books, books that by their nature are optional
rather than required reading."' 21 Brennan further distinguished that no
challenge was made to the authority afforded to school boards in library
book acquisitions and that this case solely concerned the "removal from
school libraries of books originally placed there by the school authori-
ties, or without objection by them."' 22 While fully agreeing that school
boards "must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in
such a way as to transmit community values,' and that 'there is a legiti-
mate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for
authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political,' "123
the plurality stressed that such prerogative "must be exercised in a man-
ner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amend-
ment." ' 24 Brennan then laid the foundation for the plurality's argument
by identifying not only the First Amendment's protection of free speech,
but also its "inherent corollary"'' 25 of the right to receive information-a
right of which students are beneficiaries and "may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to commu-
nicate."' 2 6 Though conceding that both rights must be tapered in accor-
dance with the "special characteristics of the school environment,"' 27 the
plurality contended that "the special characteristics of the school library
make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of the
First Amendment rights of students"' 28 and, while the board members
may have a valid claim "of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum
by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values," their "reli-
ance upon that duty is misplaced where, as here, they attempt to extend
their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of
119. Id. at 418.
120. Pico, 457 U.S. at 861.
121. Id. at 861-62.
122. Id. at 862.
123. Id. at 864 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 10, Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (No. 80-2043)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 867.
126. Id. at 867-68 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
127. Id. at 868 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
128. Id.
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the classroom, into the school library and the regime of voluntary
inquiry that there holds sway." 129 In the special library setting, Brennan
opined, the school board still retains "significant discretion,"' 30 and
though such discretion "may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or
political manner,"' 3 1 the board may permissibly remove books based on
"educational suitability."' 32 Thus, he determined, the issue of whether or
not students' First Amendment rights had been violated would be con-
tingent upon:
[T]he motivation behind petitioners' [the Board's] actions. If peti-
tioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents [the
students] access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this
intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' decisions, then petition-
ers have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. To
permit such intentions to control official actions would be to
encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy unequiv-
ocally condemned [by the Court] .... [W]e hold that local school
boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by
their removal to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion." 133
Analyzing the factual record, the plurality found that although the
board's proffered reasons appeared to be legitimate on their face, 13 4 the
fact that it neglected to employ "established, regular, and facially unbi-
ased procedures for the review of controversial materials"' 35 and
instead, both engaged in "highly irregular and ad hoc" decision-making,
rejecting the advice of its newly created committee without explanation,
created a genuine issue of material fact as to the motivation behind the
removals. As such, the grant of summary judgment to the school board
was inappropriate, and the Second Circuit's decision of reversal and
remand was affirmed. 136
Concurring in part and concurring in the plurality's judgment, Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote his own opinion on the basis that "the principle
involved here is both narrower and more basic than the 'right to receive
information' identified by the plurality," and that the right in question is
not "somehow associated with the peculiar nature of the school
129. Id. at 869.
130. Id. at 870.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 871.
133. Id. at 871-72 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
134. Id. at 873.
135. Id. at 874.
136. Id. at 875.
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library."' 37 Instead, penned Blackmun, the issue in Pico was "how to
make the delicate accommodation between the limited constitutional
restriction that ... is imposed by the First Amendment, and the necessa-
rily broad state authority to regulate education."' 38 Agreeing with the
plurality's decision, Justice Blackman found the "proper balance" to be
attained "by holding that school officials may not remove books for the
purpose of restricting access to political ideas or social perspective dis-
cussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials'
disapproval of the ideas involved."' 39
Justice White also concurred in the plurality's judgment, but
declared any analysis regarding First Amendment issues to be inappro-
priate, as the Court "should not decide constitutional questions until it is
necessary to do so, or at least until there is better reason to address them
than are [sic] evident here."' 4 ° Based on the "unresolved factual issue
... [of] the reason or reasons underlying the school board's removal of
the books," Justice White agreed with the appellate decision "on such a
fact-bound issue," and, finding summary judgment improper, concurred
with the plurality in affirming the Second Circuit's ruling. 4'
Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor filed separate
dissenting opinions. 42 Justice Burger was primarily perturbed by the
plurality's employment of the right to receive information, arguing that
"no such right ...has previously been recognized,"' 43 and that "no
amount of 'limiting' language could rein in the sweeping 'right' the plu-
rality would create."' 44 Emphasizing the fact that "local control of edu-
cation involves democracy in a microcosm" ' 45 and that the authority of
elected school board members does not go unchecked since they can be
replaced by community voters, Burger criticized the plurality's "politi-
cal" standard by contending that "virtually all educational decisions nec-
essarily involve 'political' determinations. "146
Justice Powell, on the other hand, objected primarily to the abstract
nature of the standard set forth by the plurality and the specter of school
137. Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 879.
139. Id. at 879-80.
140. Id. at 884 (White, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 883.
142. Id. at 885 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 904 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While all four dissenting justices penned
separate opinions, Justice Burger's dissent was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. Id. at 885 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Justices
Burger and Powell. Id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 887 (Burger, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 892.
145. Id. at 891.
146. Id. at 890.
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board litigation flooding the courts on account of such a "standardless
standard that affords no more than subjective guidance to school boards,
their counsel, and to courts that now will be required to decide whether a
particular decision was made in a 'narrowly partisan or political man-
ner.' "1 47 Justice Rehnquist, echoing the sentiments expressed in the dis-
sents of both Justices Burger and Powell, went further to say that
although he could "cheerfully concede" the unconstitutionality of school
board discretion exercised in a "narrowly partisan or political manner,"
"in this case, the facts taken most favorably to the respondents [students]
suggest that nothing of this sort happened." '148 Supplementing Justice
Burger's observation, Justice Rehnquist also chastised Justice Brennan's
approval of book removals based on "educational suitability," remarking
that "such determinations are based as much on the content of the book
as determinations that the book espouses pernicious political views." 149
Finally, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissent, advocating that "it is
not the function of the courts to make the decisions that have been prop-
erly relegated to the elected members of the school boards. It is the
school board that must determine educational suitability, and it has done
so in this case."1 50
C. Post-Pico Removal Cases
In the wake of Pico, articles and notes debated the impact and
worth of the Supreme Court's decision,1 51 but many could agree that the
"one clear legacy of Pico will be more litigation over school library
book removals."'' 52 Since Pico, three courts have addressed such cases,
all utilizing a Pico-type analysis in reaching their decisions.
1. CAMPBELL V. ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the removal of a book called
Voodoo & Hoodoo from all of the school libraries in the St. Tammany
Parish. 3 After a formal complaint regarding the book was filed with the
147. Id. at 894-95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 917.
150. Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. See generally, Menzel, supra note 3 (analyzing the opinions and principle set forth in
Pico); David Schimmel, The Limits on School Board Discretion: Board of Education v. Pico, 6
WEST's EDuc. L. REP. 285, 286 (1983) (discussing the "panorama of judicial perspectives" in
Pico); Helen M. Quenemoen, Case Comment, Board of Education v. Pico: The Supreme Court's
Answer to School Library Censorship, 44 OMio Sr. L.J. 1103, 1104 (1983) (examining the Pico
opinions "to determine what precisely was decided.").
152. Quenemoen, supra note 151, at 1120.
153. Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 185 (5th Cir. 1995).
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principal, a school-level committee was organized to review the issue. 154
The book, which discussed the development and evolution of African
tribal religion and included traditional "spells," was primarily charged
with "heighten[ing] children's infatuation with the supernatural and
incit[ing] students to try the explicit 'spells,'" which the complaining
parents believed to be "potentially dangerous."' 55 The committee, find-
ing the book to be "educationally suitable" and providing "supplemental
information/explanation to a topic included in the approved 8th grade
Social Studies curriculum,"' 56 unanimously denied its removal and "rec-
ommended retaining Voodoo & Hoodoo in the school's library, albeit on
a specially-designated 'reserve' shelf available only to eighth-grade stu-
dents who had obtained written permission from their parents to check
out the Book."' 157 Pursuant to school board procedure, the decision was
appealed to a parish-wide committee, who affirmed the first committee's
decision of retaining the book subject to limited access, with one person,
a board member, dissenting on the grounds that the book "promotes
extremely unhealthy practices that are not conducive to sound moral val-
ues." 1 58 The parent again appealed to the school board who, led by the
dissenting member of the appellate committee, voted for permanent
removal of the text from all parish school libraries despite the fact that
"many of the school board members had not even read the book." 159 The
board neither expressed any "opinion on the merits of the recommenda-
tions from the two committees" that had previously reviewed the com-
plaint, nor "did the School Board state the reason for its removal
action."160
After a review of the Supreme Court's analysis in Pico, the court
determined that "even though the constitutional analysis in the Pico plu-
rality does not constitute binding precedent, it may properly serve as
guidance in determining whether the School Board's removal decision
was based on unconstitutional motives."'' Finding that "at this stage,
we simply do not have a full picture of the reasons why the School
Board members ... voted to remove the Book," the court deemed sum-
mary judgment inappropriate as the suspect nature of the board's "fail-
ure to consider, much less adopt, the recommendation of the two
previous committees ... in apparent disregard of its own outlined proce-
154. Id. at 186.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 190.
160. Id. at 187.
161. Id. at 189.
[Vol. 63:943
PICO TAKES A VISIT TO CUBA
dures," created a genuine issue of material fact-that fact being "the
true, decisive motivation behind the School Board's decision.' ' 62
2. CASE V. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 233
A few months later, in Case v. Unified School District No. 233,163 a
district court in the Tenth Circuit granted injunctive relief to students
bringing suit against a school board for the removal of two books with
gay or lesbian story lines from the school's library." 6 The two books,
which had been donated by local gay rights organizations, stirred politi-
cal controversy, prompting the assistant superintendent, Dr. Banikowski,
to convene the school librarians for review of the accepted texts. 65 The
librarians determined that one, Annie on My Mind-of which the library
already happened to own several copies-contained literary merit and
should be retained, while the other was "shallow and incomplete," and
should be removed. 66 Banikowski informed Superintendent Dr. Wim-
mer of the outcome and Wimmer relayed the information to two school
board members. Although no formal complaints had been received from
parents, Wimmer expressed concern about the library's donation proce-
dures as well as the public unease surrounding the most recent donations
and called another meeting with the librarians to "make a 'final disposi-
tion' of the book donation issue."'' 67
Preceding this meeting, Wimmer created a set of "Book Donation
Guidelines" without "'seek[ing] input from anyone in the[ir] preparation
of these guidelines,' and unilaterally decided prior to this meeting that
the District would not only refuse the books donated.., but that existing
copies of Annie on My Mind would be removed from the District's
libraries."'168 At the meeting, Wimmer informed the librarians that "the
District needed to take action because of community concerns regarding
the issue" and that "based upon his experience in working with the
Board members, Dr. Wimmer felt that a majority of the Board 'would
favor taking this book off the shelves.' 1 69 At no point in the meeting
was the literary merit, appropriateness, or educational suitability of the
book discussed. 7° All copies of Annie on My Mind were subsequently
removed. 7 1
162. Id. at 190.
163. 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kan. 1995).
164. Id. at 877.
165. Id. at 867.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 868.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 869.
171. Id.
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Students troubled by the book's removal voiced their dissatisfac-
tion to the school board at a meeting shortly thereafter. 7 2 Despite First
Amendment warnings by its attorney, the school board, without discuss-
ing the literary merit or educational suitability of the text, voted to
uphold Wimmer's decision based on its opinion that the book offered a
"glorification of the gay lifestyle,"' 7 3 "seemed to have one goal ... [t]o
say its okay to be gay" '17 4 when "it is not 'okay' to be gay, '[b]ecause
engaging in a gay lifestyle can lead to death, destruction, disease, emo-
tional problems,' """5 and that homosexuality "obviously leads to a [sic]
onslaught of physical destruction," '76 "is a mental disorder, immoral,
and contrary to the teachings of the Bible and the Christian church,"
' 177
"is sinful in the eyes of God,"'178 and did not align with "community
moral standards" or "traditional family values."
179
As in Campbell, the court in Case also found that despite the fact
that "the plurality decision in Pico is not binding precedent ... the court
concludes that it should follow the Pico decision in analyzing," the book
removal in the instant case. 180 The district court pointed out that in
Campbell, "the court also noted that the school board's failure to follow
its own procedures raised suspicion that the motivation of the school
board was unconstitutional," 8' and that Case was similarly situated in
that the board not only "failed to follow its adopted procedures for the
reconsideration of library materials," and "ignored its own guidelines
and criteria," but also did not "await[ ] a formal complaint, nor
appoint[ ] a committee to consider the removal." '182 In light of such
behavior, the court concluded that "there is no basis in the record to
believe that these Board members meant by 'educational suitability'
anything other than their own disagreement with the ideas expressed in
the book," '183 and the board's "highly irregular and erratic" actions in
blatant "disregard of established policy and procedure" constituted
"important evidence of their [the board members'] improper motiva-
tion," 184 warranting the denial of summary judgment in favor of the
172. Id.
173. Id. at 870.
174. Id. (alteration in original).
175. Id. at 871.
176. Id. at 870 (alteration in original).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 871.
180. Id. at 875.
181. Id. (citing Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 190-91 (5th Cir.
1995)).
182. Id. at 872.
183. Id. at 875.
184. Id. at 876.
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school district and the grant of injunctive relief in favor of the
students. 85
3. COUNTS V. CEDARVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT
Most recently, a district court in the Eight Circuit applied Pico, not
to a book that was removed entirely from the library, but to one that was
merely restricted and allowed to be read only by students with parental
permission.186 In Counts v. Cedarville School District, a parent and her
school-board-member pastor filed a "Reconsideration Request Form,"
calling for the removal of a particular book in the Harry Potter series
from the school's library.' 87 Pursuant to policy and procedure, a library
committee was formed and after reviewing the book, unanimously voted
to retain it in library circulation without restriction. 88 The school libra-
rian presented the committee's recommendation to the school board,
who subsequently voted three-to-two to restrict access not only to the
book in the complaint, but to three other Harry Potter series books as
well, despite the fact that only one member of the board had read only
one of the four restricted books' 8 9 on the basis that "the books might
promote disobedience and disrespect for authority, and . . . the books
deal with 'witchcraft' and the 'occult."'' 9 ° Following this vote, the
novels were removed from general circulation and available only with
signed parental permission. 19'
The court assessed the proffered justifications set forth by the
school board and found the first to be unreasonable based on its specula-
tive nature, particularly in light of the fact that none of the board mem-
bers promulgating the restriction had read all of the books they claimed
"could create anarchy" or "lead kids into juvenile delinquency,"' 192 and
their fears were based, not on current behavioral problems, but only on
what students "might do later."' 193 The Court rejected the witchcraft
argument as well, citing Pico and explaining that "regardless of the per-
sonal taste with which these individuals regard 'witchcraft,' it is not
properly within their power and authority as members of the defendant's
school board to prevent the students at Cedarville from reading about
it."' 9' 4 Granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff student, the
185. Id. at 877.
186. Counts v. Cedarville Sch. Dist., 295 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (W.D. Ark. 2003).
187. Id. at 1001.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1002.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1003.
193. Id. at 1004.
194. Id.
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judge held that no genuine issue of material fact existed and "the conclu-
sion is inevitable that defendant removed the books from its library
shelves for reasons not authorized by the Constitution." '195
IV. i VAMOS A CUBA!: PIco IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Factual Background
In April of 2006, Mr. Amador, a parent and former political pris-
oner from Cuba, lodged a formal complaint with the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas Elementary School concerning a book his daughter had
checked out from the library, titled iVamos a Cuba!, and requesting its
removal from the "total school environment" on the grounds that "as a
former political prisoner from Cuba," he found "the material to be
untruthful. It portrays a life in Cuba that does not exist." 19 6 The book
listed in the complaint was one volume in a larger series of picture
books entitled "A Visit To," which aim to convey basic information
about life in other countries to young readers between the ages of four
and eight and had been acquired by school libraries in the district begin-
ning in 2001.197 The school board rule ("the Rule") pertaining to library
materials identified a list of fifteen criteria to be used in evaluating texts,
such as "educational significance, appropriateness, and accuracy."
198
The Rule also delineated specific procedures for handling library book
complaints, which begins with an "initial, school level review of the
complaint, followed by a district level review, and finally, a review
before the School Board itself."'199
In response to the complaint filed by Mr. Amador, a School Materi-
als Review Committee ("SMRC") was formed and in a seven to one
vote, elected to retain the book in the library."° At the SMRC's meet-
ing, all eight members found the book to be "educationally significant
and developmentally appropriate," "seven SMRC members found the
book to meet the accuracy criteria,"20 1 and six of the members described
the book as "scrupulously apolitical, having no political slant, and no
political implications." ' Before the decision had a chance to be
appealed to a district level review, however, a member of the school
board, Mr. Bolafios, "proposed that the School Board immediately
195. Id. at 1005.
196. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
197. Id. at 1248-49.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1250-51.
201. Id. at 1250.
202. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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remove i Vamos a Cuba! from the libraries without waiting for the
administrative process concerning removal of the book to run its
course."20 3 Adding the item "PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN FROM
THE HURTFUL & INSULTING DISTORTIONS OF THE BOOK
'VAMOS A CUBA' BY REMOVING THESE BOOKS FROM ALL
OF OUR PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARIES, ' 2 °4 to the following board
meeting's agenda, the instigating member presented his argument,
detailing certain distortions he found in the text:20 5
" Book's distortion: "The people of Cuba eat, work and study just
like you," page 5.
Reality: Nothing could be further from the truth. The people of
Cuba survive without civil liberties and due process under the law
... People are told where to work. They lose their job if they do
not follow the dictates of the communist party. Children are
indoctrinated and forced to chant Castro's greatness in class.
* Book's distortion: "White rice is the most common food in Cuba.
Black beans are eaten. Arroz con Polio is another favorite dish,"
page 12.
Reality: Food is rationed; people stand in line for hours to ask for
their measly ration only to be told they ran out. Children stop
receiving their milk ration at the age of six.
" Book's distortion: "The major celebration in Cuba is 'Carnival.'
It is celebrated on July 26," page 26.
Reality: The annual commemoration of July 26th is the symbolic
observation of the rise to power of Castro's communist, totalitar-
ian regime. It is a day of mourning for most Cubans. Cubans cele-
brate the 20th of May and the 28th of January, to celebrate their
independence from Spain and the birth of Jose Martf...
* Book's distortion: "The celebrations in Cuba are a mix of Afri-
can and Catholic roots," page 27.
Reality: Historically, Castro's regime has prohibited or chastised
those that engage in religious practices .... [R]eligious leaders
... have been imprisoned. A famous cry while facing Castro's
firing squad was "Vivo Cristo el Rey" (long live Christ the
King). 20 6
The rest of the Board proceeded to debate these points, making
"references to political issues and viewpoints," and "sharply" criticizing
"the book for omitting negative political information about the Castro
regime from its contents. 20 7 The children's book was likened to "books
203. Id. at 1251.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1251-52.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1252.
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about pornography," "devil worship," and "Hitler Youth, or Nazism, or
the KKK Youth," and characterized as "especially damaging to the sen-
sibilities of this community."2 8 Some members described the suffering
they and their families experienced at the hands of Castro.2 °9 Mr. Bola-
fios urged his position favoring an "immediate ban" on the text because
he felt the process dictated by the Rule did not "satisfy the segment of
our community that is outraged, that feels discriminated against by this
book, '21 0 and it "required someone to complain at each of the more than
30 schools bearing the book"2 ' for its full removal to be effected.
Following the discussion, the school board's attorney warned the
members that their actions might implicate constitutional issues and that
"there was no provision in the School Board's rules to allow the Board
to 'act independently and remove a book that it finds objectionable.
Rather, it must follow the process that is in that rule in order to achieve
that purpose.' ,,212 The Board subsequently voted six-to-three to allow
the "administrative process" to run its course.213
Mr. Amador was informed of the SMRC's decision and elected to
appeal to the school district, initiating the formation of a District Materi-
als Review Committee ("DMRC") for the issue's reconsideration.21 4
Prior to the DMRC meeting, the superintendent issued a memo offering
alternatives to removal of the book, including the addition of other, more
accurate materials about Cuba to be read in comparison, a bookplate
explaining that some of the information was inaccurate, or the institution
of parental consent to check the book out from the library. 215 At the
beginning of the meeting, DMRC members voted on which criteria
should guide the inquiry's focus and elected to evaluate the children's
book on the basis of "educational significance, appropriateness, and
accuracy. '21 6 During the meeting, participants debated other points of
supposed inaccuracy or misrepresentation, including:
In the countryside, houses are simple. They are built with
palm trunks. The roofs are made of palm leaves or straw.
It should have been said that many houses are built that way, but
certainly not the majority of those in the countryside. Further-
more, the described houses (bohios) are not built with the trunk
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1252-53.
215. Id. at 1253-54.
216. Id. at 1254.
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... but with... the upper part attached to the trunk of the long
leaf .... No straw is used in the roof only the leafs [sic].
" All students do some work during the school day. Some work
in the garden, the older ones working [sic] factories.
This is absolutely wrong. From the 6th grade on, students go to
the countryside for a period of 45 days to do unpaid agricultural
work, fulltime. Nowadays from the senior high level, all must go
to the countryside to do unpaid agricultural work, on a permanent
basis, alternating half day [sic] in the fields and half in the class-
room. Needless to say that learning suffers. In addition to great
implications of the forced separation from the families at that age
and the undesirable environmental conditions. [sic] High preg-
nancy rates in adolescence are a bi-product of this system.
• In a Cuban valley, there are big colored paintings, on the
rocks and caves. These were painted by Cuba's inhabitants
about a thousand years ago.
This is probably the worst factual error in the book. This paint
was made in the 1960's ... the writer introduces this gross misin-
formation that really has no excuse. This huge painting called
Mural de la Prehistoria is located in the Valle de Vifiales in Pinar
del Rio province.2 17
One participant in the meeting even argued that the "titles of the
Cuba Books are 'misrepresentations' because they mistakenly imply that
one can visit Cuba freely. ' ' 21s After considering all of the information,
however, the DMRC, at its second meeting, "eventually determined that
the Cuba Books met the School Board Rule,... were supplemental and
not mandatory, and . . . were valuable to an individual course of
study. '21 9 The group then looked to appropriateness and accuracy, but
considered these factors "in light of the criteria of scope, special fea-
tures, translation integrity, and aesthetic quality,' '22 0 and as far as "miss-
ing facts," assessed "whether those facts were meant to be included in a
book for young children. '12 2 ' At the culmination of the review, the
DMRC elected to keep the books in the library without restriction by a
vote of fifteen-to-one. 2 2 The superintendent subsequently affirmed this
recommendation and informed Mr. Amador of his decision. Mr. Amador
then appealed to the school board. 2 3
Just prior to the school board's review of the decisions of the
217. Id. at 1255.
218. Id. at 1254.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1255.
221. Id. at 1255-56.
222. Id. at 1256.
223. Id.
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SMRC and DMRC, its attorney issued another memorandum warning of
potential liability and constitutional claims that might consequently arise
from any deviating action taken by the board in this matter.22 4 The attor-
ney specifically noted that reviews by the DMRC could not apply to
books district wide and that "although the Rule does not prohibit the
Board from making a decision affecting the District as a whole, such
District-wide impact would be more susceptible to legal challenge."22
The attorney further cautioned that "[i]t is in our opinion that deviation
from the DMRC's decision, especially in light of the extensive analysis
and deliberations ... would most likely subject a decision by the board
to a legal challenge. 226
Notwithstanding these admonitions, however, the board issued a
final order removing not only all copies of iVamos a Cuba! from all of
the school libraries in the district, but also removing all of the other
books in the series from all of the other libraries as well, 227 despite the
fact that none of the other books had been reviewed for accuracy nor
subjected to the appropriate removal procedures.2 28 The decision began
with a resolution submitted by Bolafios titled "TEACHING OUR CHIL-
DREN THE TRUTH ABOUT CUBA BY REMOVING THE BOOK
'VAMOS A CUBA' FROM ALL OF OUR PUBLIC SCHOOL
LIBRARIES & REPLACING THEM WITH HISTORICALLY ACCU-
RATE AND EDUCATIONALLY RELEVANT BOOKS" and stating
that the book "should not remain in the hands and minds of innocent five
to nine year old children.- 229 Reviewing Bolafios's proposition and
reaching their final conclusion, Board members appeared to decide the
issue based on their personal feelings. The chairman of the board com-
mented that it was "in the lack of information that I think we as the
Cuban community are offended. '2 30 Another member identified her
''commitment to stand with the Cuban American community" and stated
that "she must support removal of the Book because she would not be
doing [her] job as a board member if [she] were to reach any [other]
conclusion. 231 Most notably, one board member favoring retention of
the book commented on the "excellent process" mandated by the school
board Rule and chastised her fellow board members:
We are rejecting the professional recommendation of our staff based
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1257.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1286.
229. Id. at 1257.
230. Id. at 1258.
231. Id. at 1259.
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on political imperatives that have been pressed upon members of this
board, which I completely understand, and with which I sympathize,
but one of the things we did when we took an oath of office today is
to uphold the Constitution of the United States as it has been set
down and interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.232
Finally, another member expressed concern that the group was
being pressured by politics into voting for removal and that "he could
not vote his [sic] the way his conscience directed 'without feeling
threatened.' ,233
B. Holding
1. FIRST AMENDMENT ALLEGATIONS AND SCHOOL BOARD RESPONSE
Upon execution of the board's final order of removal, the parent of
another child attending the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Elementary
School, along with the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida,
brought suit against the school board, alleging that its removal of the
books violated the First Amendment because the "[o]rder [was] not con-
tent and viewpoint neutral,' 234 and the "decision was motivated by
School Board and community disapproval of the content in the
books. 2 35 Justifying its actions, the school Board proffered four argu-
ments contesting the validity of the plaintiffs' First Amendment
claims: 236 (1) Pico's seven-opinioned plurality decision has no meaning-
ful precedential value and thus should not be applied; 237 (2) under the
standard set forth in the subsequently decided case of Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier,38 the board's removal would be justified "if the school
library selection process were regarded as 'school-sponsored speech'
because the replacement of such inaccurate books is 'reasonably related
to a legitimate pedagogical concern;' "239 (3) under Hazelwood and Elev-
enth Circuit precedent in Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County,
Florida24° and Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County,24 ' both
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1260.
234. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 38, Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (No.
06-21577).
235. Id. at 36.
236. Defendants' Initial Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 1-2, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (No. 06-21577).
237. Id. at 1.
238. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
239. Defendants' Initial Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 236, at 2.
240. 862 F.2d 1517 (11 th Cir. 1989).
241. 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004).
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the selection and removal of public-school library books is a "curricular
function in a nonpublic forum that constitutes 'government speech,"'
and thus does not implicate the First Amendment rights of the plain-
tiffs;. 42 and (4) even if Pico's standard were applied, the board's actions
are consistent with the "educational suitability" exception distinguished
by Justice Brennan due to the fact that the books were removed "because
they are rife with material omissions of basic facts, and are so mislead-
ing as to present a false view of the countries as a matter of fact. 24 3
2. EXAMINATION OF PRIOR CASE LAW
Before directly addressing the arguments before the court, District
Judge Gold articulated a summary of the First Amendment constitu-
tional issues implicated in the present matter and opened his opinion in
Vamos a Cuba by reiterating the point that the instant case concerned
"library books, books that are by their nature optional rather than
required reading. 244 After likening the inquiry to that of Pico, the judge
pointed out that the case was unique because, instead of dealing with the
usual high-school books objectionable on grounds of "vulgar language
and inappropriate sexual references," the library books being banned
here "are written in a simple manner for young elementary school chil-
dren and provide superficial introductions about how people live their
lives in foreign countries. 245 In lieu of the typically objectionable fea-
tures of books in prior challenges, "the heart of the argument" for the
removal of Vamos a Cuba is that it "omit[s] the harsh truth about totali-
tarian life in Communist Cuba.1
246
Turning to the claims before the court, Judge Gold laid the founda-
tion for his analysis by first highlighting the long-standing Supreme
Court case law pertaining to school board authority in the realm of both
library and scholastic affairs, paying special attention to the traditional
balancing act employed by courts between the broad discretion afforded
to schools boards in the management of public education and the fact
that such discretion "must be exercised in a manner that comports with
the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment." 247 Recognizing
that students' rights may be limited, but not completely annihilated, in a
curricular context, Judge Gold returned his focus to the case at hand and
242. Defendants' Initial Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 236, at 3.
243. Id. at I.
244. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1265-66.
247. Id. at 1266. For a summary of such case law, see supra Part H.A.
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the "'unique role of the school library' as a place where students [can]
engage in voluntary inquiry" emphasized in Pico.24 8 After recounting
the facts, holding, and various opinions in Pico,2 4 9 Judge Gold elected to
hold off on addressing the school board's first argument and instead
turned to the claim that Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier250 condoned the
board's action.
A school-related case reviewed by the Court six years after Pico,
Hazelwood concerned the removal of two pages of articles regarding
students' experiences with pregnancy and parental divorce from a school
newspaper destined for publication on the grounds that the material was
inappropriate for younger students and violated the privacy of certain
parents. Upon finding that the newspaper was produced as part of the
educational curriculum of the school's journalism class, the Court fash-
ioned an "imprimatur of the school"25 2 standard and determined that
materials that "students, parents, and members of the public might rea-
sonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.... may be fairly
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur
in a traditional classroom setting," and "educators are entitled to exer-
cise greater control ... to assure ... that the views of the individual
speaker are not attributed to the school," '53 so long as the actions taken
are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. '"254 As such,
the Court found the school board in Hazelwood to have acted within the
boundaries of its authority in censoring the two articles.2
Interestingly, Hazelwood's majority opinion in no way referred or
cited to Pico-an observation with which the school board buttressed its
argument. Though acknowledging this point, Judge Gold deemed this
omission to be "presumably ... because the issues involved were totally
different in the sense that Hazelwood was a 'student speech' case, while
Pico dealt with removal of books from a school library." '256 Judge Gold
stipulated that while it might be possible under a "more lenient Hazel-
wood test," for school boards to exercise their discretion over library
materials without violating the First Amendment as long as that discre-
tion was "reasonably related to pedagogical concerns," case law in the
248. Id. at 1268 (quoting Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 868-69 (1982)). For a summary of Pico, see supra Parts III.A-B.
249. Vamos a Cuba, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1267-71.
250. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
251. Id. at 262-63.
252. Id. at 271-76.
253. Id. at 271.
254. Id. at 273.
255. Id. at 276. See also supra note 27.
256. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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Eleventh Circuit exhibits that "the Hazelwood test has not been so
expanded where non-curricular books are at issue and where, even under
the Hazelwood standard, the school officials' actions were motivated by
a disagreement with the views expressed in the books as compared to
pedagogical concerns relating to vulgarity and sexuality." '57 Gold then
supported this contention, dispelling arguments (2) and (3) with the
review of three Eleventh Circuit cases.
The opinion first addressed Virgil v. School Board of Columbia
County, Florida,258 a case upholding a school board's removal of a pre-
viously approved textbook on the grounds that the removal was based on
the board's legitimate pedagogical concerns reasonably related to the
text's vulgarity and sexual explicitness. 9 In evaluating the board's
action, the court found two issues especially pertinent to its application
of the Hazelwood standard. First, both parties had stipulated to the moti-
vation behind the removal-the vulgar and sexually explicit contents of
the work-and no allegations of ulterior motives or pretext were
presented before the court. 260 Therefore, the only issue to be decided by
the court regarding the board's motivation was whether it was reasona-
bly related to the removal of the text.2 6' Second, the questionable mater-
ials in the case had "not been banned from the school," were "available
in the school library," and no teacher or student had been "prohibited
from assigning or reading these works or discussing the themes con-
tained therein in class or on school property. '"262 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit was careful to point on that in this case, the
removed materials "obviously carry the imprimatur of the school"263 and
specifically emphasized that "we decide today only that the Board's
removal of these works from the curriculum did not violate the Constitu-
tion. '264 The court also clarified that "we need not in this case address
the validity of school action to remove a book from a separate outside
reading list .... [I]t might be easier to make such separate, outside read-
ings subject to parental approval, or otherwise limit the imprimatur of
school approval. r2 65 The court even referred to Pico briefly in a foot-
note, but primarily to indicate that it was inapplicable to Virgil because
(1) the materials were not library books; (2) determination of a poten-
tially unconstitutional motive was not at issue; and (3) the Eleventh Cir-
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. 862 F.2d. 1517 (11 th Cir. 1989).
259. Id, at 1525.
260. Id. at 1522-23, 1522-23 nn.6-7.
261. Id. at 1523.
262. Id. at 1525.
263. Id. at 1522.
264. Id. at 1525 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 1522 n.5.
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cuit at such time would not make any "suggestion as to the appropriate
standard to be applied in a case where one party had demonstrated that
removal stemmed from opposition to the ideas contained in the disputed
materials. 266
The next Eleventh Circuit case addressed in the Vamos a Cuba
opinion, Searcey v. Harris, dealt with a school board's prohibition of a
particular organization from participating in a public-high-school
"career day." '26 7 The organization, Atlanta Peace Association, argued
that it was wrongfully barred from participating because the school
board disagreed with its military views and such view-point discrimina-
tion violated the First Amendment.268 Although the board attempted to
argue that "Hazelwood does not prohibit school officials from engaging
in viewpoint discrimination," the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, contending
that "Hazelwood involved a content based distinction," regarding sexu-
ally explicit material and that "there was no indication that the principal
was motivated by a disagreement with the views expressed in the arti-
cles." '2 69 Finding that the school board in Searcey had discriminated
against the organization based on its viewpoint, the court clarified the
Eleventh Circuit's stance on Hazelwood, directing that "although Hazel-
wood provides reasons for allowing a school official to discriminate
based on content, we do not believe it offers any justification for
allowing educators to discriminate based on viewpoint."2 0
Finally, Judge Gold addressed the case brought forth by the defen-
dant school board, Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County, in
which the Eleventh Circuit upheld a school board's action compelling a
student to remove religious icons she had painted on a public-school
mural created as part of a beautification project.27' In Bannon, the court
found the murals to bear the imprimatur of the school and applied Hazel-
wood, finding that the student's drawings were "school-sponsored
expression in a nonpublic forum subject to restriction ... because they
occurred in the context of a curricular activity," and therefore, "censor-
ship ... was a reasonable content-based restriction that was rationally
related to the legitimate pedagogical concern of avoiding the religious
controversy and debate generated" by the artwork. 2
266. Id. at 1523 n.8.
267. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989).
268. Id. at 1315.
269. Id. at 1324-25.
270. Id. at 1325 (second emphasis added).
271. Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2004).
272. Id. (emphasis added).
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3. FACTUAL APPLICATION AND OUTCOME
Given the unique nature of library books and their distinction from
curricular materials in both Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit case
law, Judge Gold determined that "the mere purchase of a few books
which essentially remained on the library shelves over a period of sev-
eral years can hardly be characterized as 'curricular' or be argued to
reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school," and concluded that the
"book removal did not in fact occur in the context of a curricular activ-
ity. ' 273 Furthermore, based on the evidence, it appeared to the court that
unlike Bannon, the Miami-Dade School Board was "concerned with
viewpoint, not content, that related to life in foreign countries," and
"accordingly, even under the more lenient Hazelwood standard, the
School Board's action would be in violation of Searcey and Bannon. 274
Finding Virgil and Searcey to be supportive of a Pico application and
finding Bannon to be "not on point" and "totally unrelated to the facts
and issues in this case, 275 Judge Gold contended that "the case law is
not unclear in the Eleventh Circuit and the School Board is less than
candid with this Court in suggesting otherwise. '276 Therefore, "in the
absence of a binding Eleventh Circuit opinion, 277 the court rejected the
school board's first argument and elected to follow in the footsteps of
the Fifth Circuit in Campbell78 and the Tenth Circuit District Court in
Case,279 adjudicating Vamos a Cuba according to a Pico analysis.28 °
Recalling that under Pico, a school board may not remove non-curricu-
lar library books simply because the board "dislikes the ideas or the
point-of-view contained in the books and seeks by their removal to pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, or other materi-
als,"28' Judge Gold narrowed the focus of inquiry to the board's final
argument: Did the Miami-Dade School Board make its removal decision
based on "inaccuracies" or based on unconstitutional motives? And, if
such impermissible motives were at play, were they the decisive factor
in the board's action? Answering both inquiries in the affirmative, the
judge determined that the school board members "intended by their
removal of the books to deny schoolchildren access to ideas or points-
273. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
274. Id. at 1279.
275. Id. at 1277.
276. Id. at 1281.
277. Id.
278. See supra Part III.C.I.
279. See supra Part III.C.2.
280. Vamos a Cuba, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
281. Id. at 1283.
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of-view with which the school officials disagreed, and that this intent
was the decisive factor in their removal decision," and thus the board
"abused its discretion in a manner that violated the transcendent impera-
tives of the First Amendment. 282
Though board members insisted they had been concerned with and
motivated by the book's factual inaccuracies and omissions throughout
the entire process, the court identified these goals as "post hoc rational-
izations," that do "nothing to counterbalance the overwhelming evi-
dence, for preliminary injunction purposes, of view-point discrimination
whether under the Pico or Searcey/Bannon tests. ' 83 Supporting this evi-
dentiary conclusion, Judge Gold highlighted the school board's violation
of its own procedures and blatant disregard of the recommendations of
both committees pursuant to those procedures. 284 The school board
again attempted to employ the inaccuracy argument to justify its radical
departure from the decisions of the SMRC and DMRC, but the court
discerned these arguments "now relied upon" to be "merely a pretext to
provide constitutional cover for the impermissible actions taken. 285
Given the board's rapid intervention following the SMRC's decision, it
appeared that "Mr. Bolafios' immediate desire was to circumvent the
appeals process under the Board's own rules by immediately removing
Vamos a Cuba not only from the school library . . . but in all such
libraries throughout the district. '286 Although heeding the warnings of
its attorney to allow the book to continue through the appellate process,
the board ignored the foreshadowing advice of its counsel to affirm the
prior "thorough and extensive" reviews of the committees, lest the board
open itself to constitutional liability.287 Instead, in the hearing "replete
with examples of political decision-making based upon the politics of
opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba," 288 the board recklessly dis-
pelled the SMRC and DMRC's determinations of educational suitability.
Moreover, the fact that
[T]he School Board's ultimate action was not to remove one book
from one library where one parent raised an issue, but to remove all
the Cuba Books from all the libraries and, of significant importance,
to remove the remaining nineteen books in the Series when ... none
of these other books were subjected to the School Board's own
review processes or were ever previously questioned on appeal, or
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1282.
284. Id. at 1285.
285. Id. at 1282.
286. Id. at 1286.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1285.
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were ever read by most of the School Board members prior to that
vote
2 89
only further fueled the plaintiffs' looming allegations of pretext.
Judge Gold also investigated issues of educational suitability, find-
ing credible the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts who postulated that
"the objections to the Cuba Books appear to be based on adults attempt-
ing to import an adult value system into a children's book," and that "too
much information of the kind at issue is cognitively more damaging to
young children than too little. 29° Professionals continued to testify that
"young children, the target audience of these books, would simply be
unable to grasp the level of political thought implicit" 291 in the board's
debate and that this type of information in "a simple travel book for first
and second graders" 292 would make the "books inappropriate for young
children, 2 93 particularly where the goal is "simply to show a young
child that other people in other cultures also eat, work and go to school
like they do," and not "to discuss complex issues of government with
respect to any of the countries. '294 Balancing the board's accuracy argu-
ments and the information presented by the plaintiffs' professionals,
Judge Gold posited the question:
[S]hould School Board members who happen to emigrate from any of
these [other] countries to the United States be permitted to ban books
in the Series because of their individual political orthodoxy and
point-of-view of what is "true" for a child's life in one or more of
those countries? The obvious answer is "no.'"295
Judge Gold deemed the "degree of accuracy" invoked by the board
to "sweep too broadly, ' 296 to legitimize book-banning of the sort
presented in this case. After assessing all of the facts, the judge con-
cluded that the board's rationalizations of "perceived inaccuracies
297
were simply "a guise and pretext" 298 and as such, its motivation behind
the removal decision was unconstitutional. Were courts to allow "boards
to engage in post hoc rationalization for book-banning" without conse-
quence, cautioned Judge Gold, they would be both condoning and per-
mitting public-school officials "to mask impermissibly motivated
289. Id. (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 1287.
291. Id. at 1288.
292. Id. at 1286.
293. Id. at 1288.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1283.
296. Id. at 1284.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1283.
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behavior by plausible but disingenuous justifications. '299 Finally, in
finding the ACLU's evidence more convincing-at the very least for
preliminary injunction purposes-and ruling for the plaintiffs, Judge
Gold addressed the fact that the board's removal of the books had been
supported by a large portion of the community and explained that the
court's decision, though perhaps unpopular, was the only decision viable
under the First Amendment demands of the Constitution:
Nothing written here is intended to cast doubt upon the heartfelt
point-of-view expressed by Mr. Bolafios and his supporters. Tragi-
cally, that point-of-view is based on real life experiences that mem-
bers of the Cuban Community and their families have painfully
endured in Cuba .... But many have come to this nation, and con-
tinue to do so today, for the opportunity to live in freedom under the
protection of our Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The quintessen-
tial right of freedom of speech may not be sacrificed on the alter of
beliefs .... In this nation, we do not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because some in the community find it offensive or
disagreeable. 3"
C. Should Pico Apply?
Because the decision in Pico was penned by a plurality and not by a
majority of the Court, and because there is no Eleventh Circuit precedent
applying the plurality's rationale, the first question concerning the
Vamos a Cuba case is whether or not Pico is the appropriate and appli-
cable standard. Although Pico was the first, and presently the only, book
removal challenge to be heard by the Supreme Court, 30 1 the exact nature
and weight of its holding is somewhat nebulous,3"' as "it is not an opin-
ion of the Supreme Court as an institution, and the Court itself is not
obligated to follow such an opinion. 3 °3 However, some scholars, such
as David Schimmel, have opined that "until the Court specifically modi-
fies the plurality opinion, it should certainly have more weight than dicta
and will probably be highly influential, if not binding, on lower
courts." 3° Helen M. Quenemoen echoes this approach, promulgating
the stance that "since in a plurality decision a majority of the Justices
have agreed on a result that binds the parties, sometimes that result can
have precedential effect on future cases with similar facts. In such cases
299. Id. at 1282.
300. Id. at 1284.
301. See, e.g., Menzel, supra note 3, at 1081.
302. See, e.g., supra notes 9-10.
303. Schimmel, supra note 151, at 297.
304. Id.
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it is the result, not the rationale, that is authoritative. 3 °5
The Supreme Court has held that "when a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.' ,,306 In Pico, the narrowest concurring opinion was
that of Justice White, who, if nothing else, directly indicated that moti-
vations behind the removal of library books by local school boards may
implicate the First Amendment rights of students and may constitute an
impermissible infringement upon those rights.30 7 Reading the plurality
opinion along with both concurrences, it appears that a majority of the
Court agreed both that "it is possible for a plaintiff to show a constitu-
tional violation when a school board removes books from a school
library," and that the school board's "discretion is subject to court
review if it appears that the motivation for the removals might have been
unconstitutional.' 3°8 As such, Pico "should be considered to have settled
[these two issues], with the appropriate stare decisis effect," and any
subsequent removal cases "will have to be individually litigated once
plaintiffs can establish that the motivation may not have been constitu-
tionally acceptable. 309
Considering the aforementioned approaches to determining plural-
ity precedent, it appears that Pico is the correct standard for the issues in
Vamos a Cuba. As Quenemoen predicted, cases bearing similar factual
patterns to Pico have been properly subjected to a Pico analysis, and
Vamos a Cuba should be no different. Additionally, Pico has not only
been applied by lower courts in factually uncanny cases, such as Camp-
bell3 0 and Case,31' but was even applied to board action simply restrict-
ing access to a book by requiring parental permission in Counts.3 12
Although the Counts court may have extended the Pico doctrine further
than its colleagues might, the fact that post-Pico courts have consistently
applied the unconstitutional motivation analysis in situations where
305. Quenemoen, supra note 151, at 1114.
306. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
307. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
883-84 (1982) (White, J., concurring); supra text accompanying note 141; see also Quenemoen,
supra note 151, at 1115 ("That Justice White agreed with the others in the majority that a library
book removal can so abridge students' first amendment rights that it warrants court intervention
can be inferred from his failure to join in the dissent's position that defendants' motion for
summary judgment should have been granted.").
308. Quenemoen, supra note 151, at 1115.
309. Id.
310. See supra Part III.C.I.
311. See supra Part III.C.2.
312. See supra Part III.C.3.
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proffered reasons for board action regarding library books appear
pretextual remains the same.
While the Eleventh Circuit lacks case law specifically endorsing
Pico as precedent, it also lacks case law declining its adoption in the
appropriate circumstances. Although the Court in Virgil rejected the
plaintiffs' prayer for application of Pico, it did so on account of the fact
that it was not the appropriate situation for the standard, as the books
were indisputably curricular and no allegations as to improper motive
had been made. Furthermore, the books were being removed only from
the scholastic curriculum and were still made available in the library for
both reading and discussion purposes. Despite making "no suggestion as
to the appropriate standard to be applied in a case where one party has
demonstrated that removal stemmed from opposition to the ideas con-
tained in the disputed materials," '313 the court did not repudiate Pico's
potential applicability and promoting any other opinion on this matter
would have been irrelevant to the case at hand and merely advisory.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit alluded to its propensity under the
Hazelwood standard to limit a board's authority concerning supplemen-
tal curricular materials, suggesting that "it might be easier to make such
separate, outside readings subject to parental approval, or otherwise
limit the imprimatur of school approval." '314 If the Eleventh Circuit
would be willing to narrow the acceptable boundaries of school action
exercised in reasonable relation to pedagogical concerns in the realm of
supplemental curricular materials, it is highly likely, given case law
such as Virgil, that this narrowing would be extended further in the
realm of non-curricular materials such as library books. Similarly, the
court declined to employ an unconstitutional motivation standard in
Bannon, as the situation was factually inapposite to the circumstances
warranting a Pico analysis. Not only did the murals clearly bear the
imprimatur of the school and thus command greater board discretion,
but the case concerned student free speech and expression rights, not
books. As such, invocation of the Pico standard in that case would have
been irrelevant and misguided. Finally, though also factually disparate,
the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in the Searcey decision suggests it would
support the application of Pico's plurality to Vamos a Cuba. If, as the
court ruled, Hazelwood does not offer "any justification for allowing
educators to discriminate based on viewpoint," '315 and a school board
may not deny organizations access to its school's Career Day-a forum
conceivably bearing the imprimatur of the school-because it disagrees
313. Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia County, Fla., 862 F.2d 1517, 1523 n.8 (11 th Cir. 1989).
314. Id. at 1522 n.5.
315. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (1lth Cir. 1989).
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with their political stance, it is highly likely that the Eleventh Circuit
would find removal of books based on political viewpoint discrimination
equally unconstitutional, and thus, support a motivational analysis stan-
dard akin to Pico in such pertinent situations.
D. How Should the Eleventh Circuit Rule in Vamos A Cuba?
In applying the Pico standard to the Vamos a Cuba case, the Elev-
enth Circuit should affirm the findings of District Judge Gold and hold
the Miami-Dade County School Board's removal of the "A Visit To"
series books from all of the district libraries unconstitutional based on its
politically motivated abuse of discretionary power. While Judge Gold
thoroughly and adequately supported his ruling on valid facts necessa-
rily leading to his conclusion, a couple of other points further bolster his
position. First, some argue that "any school board departure from estab-
lished book removal procedures . . . evidences an impermissible
removal, particularly when those procedures provide for non-board
input"3 '6 to safeguard against unilateral board decision-making. It
appears that courts nationwide agree with this proposition, as evidenced
by the near unanimous findings of pretext in cases where school boards
have departed from procedure-both pre-3 17 and post-Pico.3 18 In the
instant case, the Miami-Dade School Board not only violated procedure
pertaining to the review of i Vamos a Cuba! by intervening prior to the
DMRC's assessment and subsequently enforcing its pre-decided conclu-
sion after allowing the book to go through what is adequately described
as a puppet show of an appellate process, but also violated procedure
regarding the banning of the remaining books in the series with no pro-
cess whatsoever. As ACLU cooperating attorney JoNel Newman accu-
rately remarked, the board members' decision to "defy U.S. law
prohibiting censorship and ignore the recommendation of their own
Superintendent and two committees is a slap in the face to our tradition
of free speech and the School Board's own standards of Due Process,"
for "the purpose of having a procedure to evaluate a book and provide
recommendations is pointless when the School Board chooses to ignore
the advice of educators and librarians." '319 Given the fact that, as the
court in Case noted, "there is no basis in the record to believe that these
Board members meant by 'educational suitability' anything other than
316. Richard Ricci, Public School Library Book Removals: Community Values v. First
Amendment Freedoms, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW R. 166, 188 (1981).
317. See supra Part H.C.
318. See supra Part II.C.
319. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Fla., ACLU Files Lawsuit Against the
Miami-Dade County School Board over Book Censorship (June 21, 2006), available at http:I/
www.aclufl.org/news-events/?action=viewRelease&emailAlertlD= 1949.
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their own disagreement with the ideas expressed in the book, '320 an
Eleventh Circuit finding of the Miami-Dade School Board's inaccuracy
justifications as anything but politically motivated pretext would be an
equal slap in the face to First Amendment jurisprudence.
Second, the large Cuban contingency in South Florida and strong
anti-Castro sentiment are no secret, 32' and Vamos a Cuba is not the first
time these political sentiments and community pressures have had a run-
in with government officials' proper protection of First Amendment
constitutional rights.322 In The Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture, Inc.
v. The City of Miami, a Cuban museum in Miami held a fundraising art
auction that included a number of pieces created by "artists who had not
renounced the Castro regime or ...who had continued to live in a
communist Cuba." '323 Public outrage ensued at the toleration and alleged
"communist sympathies" exhibited by retention of these works in the
fundraiser; notwithstanding such opposition and community disap-
proval, however, the auction proceeded "amidst hostilities and threats,"
which included the purchasing of a controversial painting at the auction
that was subsequently burned in the streets outside the Museum in the
middle of a small crowd chanting its protests against the Cuba-friendly
artists included in the auction. 4 Sadly, the hostilities did not end after
the auction: At least one exhibition had to be postponed; a bomb was
detonated underneath the automobile of an attorney serving as a director
and vice president of the Museum; and directors and members of the
Museum's executive committees were pressured to resign and those who
remained "endured McCarthy-like allegations of communist inclinations
and sympathies. 325 After weeks of social unrest, the "divisiveness that
the controversial exhibition and auction created within the local commu-
nity was thus squarely thrust before the Miami City Commission," who
was eventually asked to "consider the management of the Museum and
find a way to oust the Museum's administration. 326 Quickly jumping to
320. Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864, 875 (D. Kan. 1995).
321. See e.g., Jay Weaver, Spy Case Nears Crucial Point, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2006, at 1B
(describing arguments that accused Cuban spies did not receive a fair trial because "the
community was saturated with anti-Castro sentiment."); see generally Jordan, supra note 19
(describing the Miami Cuban community's response to the Vamos a Cuba controversy).
322. See, e.g., Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121
(S.D. Fla. 1991) (enjoining the City of Miami from evicting the Cuban Museum from its premises
based on a finding that eviction and refusal to renew the Museum's lease were motivated by
community disapproval of a display of works by Cuban artists who had either not renounced
Castro, or were still living in a communist Cuba, and that such motivation based on the
constitutional exercise of the Museum's First Amendment rights was impermissible).
323. Id. at 1122.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1122-23.
326. Id. at 1123.
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the task, the Miami City Commission began investigating any and all
alleged violations of the Museum's lease agreement-most of which
were frivolous and unsubstantiated-and conducted three audits that
were "unprecedented in their scope and proximity to one another. 327
Transcripts from commission meetings indicated that "Commissioners
were irritated and frustrated with the problem of how to get rid of the
Cuban Museum and the underlying controversy," and finding no other
remedy but to simply let the lease expire, the Commission passed a
motion "resolving not to renew the lease agreement with the present
administration of the Cuban Museum. '3 28 The Museum brought suit and
the City Commission commenced eviction proceedings.329
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida gauged the
focus of inquiry on whether the "City of Miami denied the Cuban
Museum continued possession of the building now housing the Museum
on the basis of the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights,"
in exhibiting the works of politically controversial artists at the auc-
tion.330 The court answered this in the affirmative, finding that "the con-
troversy and public reaction to the exhibition and auction of
controversial works has pervaded the events that led to the filing of this
case," and that although the City Commission of Miami "may well have
tried to rid the City of the Cuban Museum's present administration by
pursuing what would otherwise be valid landlord-tenant concerns, the
City nonetheless appears to have fallen victim to the local community's
intolerance for those who chose to provide a forum for controversial
artists." Upon determining that the conduct of the commission and its
proffered justifications for the denial of the Museum's lease renewal
"were either minor concerns or a pretextual basis upon which to remove
the Cuban Museum and its present directors,"33' the court enjoined the
Museum's eviction and denial of lease renewal.332
As in Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture, the political circum-
stances surrounding Vamos a Cuba suggest government officials in
Miami have once again "fallen victim": 3 33 Though the highly political
comments highlighted by Judge Gold from the board's meeting minutes
hardly need reinforcement, newspaper commentary on the political land-
scape surrounding the case further buttresses the district court's finding
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1124.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1125.
331. Id. at 1127.
332. Id. at 1131.
333. Id. at 1126.
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of the "inaccuracy" explanations as pretextual.334 In researching the
case, one journalist, Rob Jordan, found that the lawsuit ignited a social
cause and "as with Elidn Gonzdilez, whose image quickly became an
icon for many in the long-suffering exile community six years ago,
Vamos a Cuba morphed overnight from a glorified picture book into a
charged talisman, a symbol of el exilio's frustrated victimhood." '335 The
overnight cause c6l bre was described as "frightening" by high school
student, Ron Bilbao-president of South Miami Senior High School's
student government association.336 Bilbao was asked to be a student par-
ticipant on one of the district's book review committees for the iVamos
a Cuba! controversy and upon his arrival at the meeting, surprisingly
found himself swarmed by the media.337 Bilbao divulged details of the
meeting to Jordan, indicating that "if you said something that was for
keeping the book, they'd whisper 'Communist' in the background....
Everybody was on edge. 338
Jordan also documented sources alleging that board members' deci-
sions were motivated not only by their heritage, but also by their desire
for re-election. One person expressed the view that board member Bola-
fios "continued the fight not only on a personal agenda, but also to gain
votes for his upcoming election. ' 339 Another community member com-
mented that the "book-banning issues had been a 'gift' to his candidate,"
as "campaign contributions to Bolaios skyrocketed in the weeks after he
took his stance. ' 34 ° A Nicaraguan-born board member, Ana Rivas-
Logan, reported being "targeted" by a local radio station popular with
Cuban exiles after she voted for the book's continuance through the
book review process. Paraphrasing advice broadcasted to listeners,
Rivas-Logan, whose family fled from Cuba prior to her birth, heard one
commentator remark, "Let's not forget, when it comes to election time,
that Mrs. Rivas-Logan is Nicaraguan."34' Interestingly enough, when it
came time for the final board meeting, Rivas-Logan identified herself as
also coming from "an oppressed regime," and stated that "from the very
first day that [she] reviewed the book [she] found the book extremely
offensive, inaccurate, full of omissions," and concluded that the "entire
Series should be replaced with a new and updated series." '342
334. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 19.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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While common knowledge and local media coverage do not and
should not control legal determinations, such evidence may be relevant
in assessing the reasonableness and viability of a court's adjudged
motives behind allegedly political actions. In this particular case, such
local coverage and information certainly lends credence to Judge Gold's
assessment of the evidence and reinforces that the correct outcome was
reached after a proper Pico analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
When Mr. Amador's nine-year old daughter checked out iVamos a
Cuba! from her elementary-school library,343 she probably never
imagined her selection would set off constitutional fireworks and initiate
a landmark case in the Eleventh Circuit. Vamos a Cuba is momentous
not only because it is the Court's first factually appropriate case for a
Pico analysis, but also because the details of the lawsuit and the argu-
ments proffered by the Miami-Dade School Board directly test the
boundaries of what Justice Brennan characterized as "perfectly permissi-
ble" book-bannings based on "educational suitability. ''3 44
In his dissent in Pico, Justice Rehnquist chastised Brennan for this
view, declaring that "such determinations are based as much on the con-
tent of the book as determinations that the book espouses pernicious
political views."3 45 Rehnquist's skeptical approach to Brennan's idealis-
tically neutral "educational suitability" determination is right on the
mark, and aptly acknowledges that "public schooling persists as such a
hotbed for controversy because of the deeply held and often conflicting
interests and demands of parents, students, and the states and local com-
munities who run public schools. 346 As courts consistently proclaim,
"the importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for
participation as citizens and in the preservation of the values on which
our society rests has long been recognized," 347 and as "democratic theo-
rists have long recognized, preparing children for democratic citizenship
is an important and demanding responsibility." '348 Such responsibility
unquestionably lies and should lie in the hands of state and local authori-
343. Jordan, supra note 19.
344. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871
(1982).
345. Id. at 917 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
346. Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children's Education?: Parents, Children, and the
State, 75 U. Cr.. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2007).
347. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
348. Eichner, supra note 346, at 1340.
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ties3 4 9 who retain "important, delicate, and highly discretionary func-
tions '"350 in the execution of their civic duty. However, "free public
education, if faithful to the idea of secular instruction and political neu-
trality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party or fac-
tion,' 35 ' and the fact that servants of the state are in charge of organizing
such education "is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strange the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our govern-
ment as mere platitudes. 352 Maxine Eichner elaborates on this notion by
pointing out that "to add to the complexity of the issue, however, the
United States is not merely a democracy, it is a liberal democracy,
whose commitment to majoritarian rule is tempered by the understand-
ing that some personal rights and liberties should not be subject to the
majority's preferences. 3 53 Ron Bilbao's feedback regarding his book
reviewing experience perfectly exemplifies Eichner's explanation of
"liberal democracy." Discussing his reaction to encounters with mem-
bers of the majority seeking to ban iVamos a Cuba!, the high school
student reasoned, "I sympathize with them [the Cuban community], I
really do, but at the end of the day, we're talking about a book for ele-
mentary school children .... You don't just ban a book because it's
painful to you." 3 54
In reviewing the Miami-Dade School Board's appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit will be faced with deciding whether the eradication of iVamos a
Cuba! and its counterparts from the entire district was a constitutional
act legitimately based on pedagogical concerns of accuracy, or whether
such proffered explanations were simply pretextual afterthoughts con-
cocted by the board to justify its impermissible actions. As Judge Gold
proclaimed, "to ban books because of perceived inaccuracies sweeps too
broadly, 355 particularly when such "inaccuracies" are omissions
excluded for the very purpose the board boasts its concern: educational
suitability for young children. Judge Gold continued to argue that "too
many works of literature could be removed from school libraries based
on the degree of accuracy according to School Board members, 356 and
he is right: were a banning on i Vamos a Cuba! permitted by the court
349. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public education
in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.").
350. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Eichner, supra note 346, at 1341.
354. Jordan, supra note 19, at 4.
355. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
439 F. Supp. 2d. 1242, 1284 (S.D. Ha. 2006).
356. Id.
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based on the board's rationale, children's rudimentary books describing,
for example, Chinese and Israeli cultures could also be banned for fail-
ing to inform young students of the grisly details pertaining to the "One-
Child" female infanticide epidemic 357 or the rampant suicide bomb deto-
nations.3 8 Just as testifying professionals deemed the dreadful details of
Castro's regime to be not only unsuitable, but "cognitively more damag-
ing" to young children, such details regarding political policy issues in
other countries would be equally unsuitable for children's books whose
purpose is simply to give young students a snapshot of other cultures.
Journalist Michael Putney made a similar observation prior to the dis-
pute's litigation.3 59 Although recognizing iVamos a Cuba!'s bemoaned
omissions as "all indisputably true," he questioned:
[I]s a simple travel book for first and second graders the proper place
to discuss [them]? Does A Visit to Argentina contain a page on the
"disappeared"? Does the book on Haiti include the Ton Ton
Macoutes and the brutality of the Duvaliers? ...Does A Visit to
Germany include a section on the Holocaust? Does A Visit to Vene-
zuela discuss how Hugo Chavez has hijacked democracy? The
answer, evidently, is No. Of course, if parents want to discuss any of
these things with their kids, they're perfectly free to do so. 3 6 0
Closing his opinion, Judge Gold warned that "our schools must
embody intellectual openness, lest they teach youth to discount impor-
tant principles of our government,"36' and place "at risk the very rights
which make this nation great." '362 To hold otherwise would only confirm
the apprehensive worry expressed by one participant in the removal
debates who professed, "I fear we may become that which we constantly
protest against." '363 The Eleventh Circuit's critical determination in this
appeal of uncharted territory will certainly address such fears, as its piv-
otal holding will indicate whether the true intentions of the Pico plural-
ity will become precedent within the Eleventh Circuit, or whether
Rehnquist's dissenting criticism will be realized and Pico will merely be
357. See, e.g., Eric Baculinao, China Grapples with Legacy of its 'Missing Girls,' NBC NEWS,
Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5953508 (last visited Dec. 23, 2008).
358. See, e.g., Ellen Knickmeyer, Suicide Bombing Kills Woman in Israel, WASH. POST, Feb.
5, 2008, at A 16.
359. Michael Putney, Let's Close the Book on Attempts To Censor, Mimii HERALD, Apr. 19,
2006, at A25.
360. Id.
361. Vamos a Cuba, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
362. Id. at 1284.
363. Id. at 1284. Interestingly (and ironically) enough, Cuban state librarians felt those fears
had already been realized and criticized the Miami-Dade School Board for its banning of Vamos a
Cuba, comparing the Board to "Nazis who censored Alice in Wonderland." Francis Robles,
Libraries in Cuba Protest Book Ban, MIAMi HERALD, Jul. 8, 2006, at lB.
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transformed into vehicle for pretext in Eleventh Circuit school board
decision-making.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
Just prior to this Note going to print, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, after over one year and a half of deliberation, handed down its
decision in the Vamos a Cuba case.3" In an evidentiarily shocking, yet
365somewhat anticipated, opinion authored by Circuit Judge Carnes, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed Judge Gold's decision based upon a finding
that "the Board did not simply dislike the ideas in the Vamos a Cuba
book," and "did not act based on an unconstitutional motive. 3 aa Carnes
was not shy about showcasing his skepticism regarding Pico's applica-
bility, remarking that "with five different opinions, and no part of any of
them gathering five votes from among the nine justices-only one of
whom is still on the Court-Pico is a non-decision so far as precedent is
concerned. It establishes no standard. ' 367 Indicating, however, that the
Court here had no desire to resolve "the question of what standard
applies to school library book removal decisions, '"368 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit placed caveats aside and elected to apply Pico in its review of the
district court's ruling, reasoning that, even assuming the plaintiffs were
entitled to the standard "of their dreams, 3 6 9 they would "still lose if the
School Board removed Vamos a Cuba not for those prohibited reasons,
but instead, as the Board insists, for legitimate pedagogical reasons such
as concerns about the accuracy of the book."3 7 Thus, the dispositive
issue governing the appeal directly mirrored the central inquiry
addressed by the district court: Were the books really removed because
of their inaccuracy, or were the removal reasons proffered by the school
364. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba),
557 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2009).
365. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has been recognized as reputedly conservative in
its adjudication of civil rights issues. See, e.g., Owen Moritz, Atlanta Appeals Court Hard To
Gauge, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16, 2000, at 32 (The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals "tended
toward conservative rulings in a number of cases during the mid-'90s involving school prayer,
First Amendment and sexual harassment."); see also Posting of David Oscar Markus to Southern
District of Florida Blog, http://www.sdfla.blogspot.comI2006 09_01_archive.html (Sept. 13,
2006, 11:59 EST) ("Lawyers who practice in the 11 th Circuit like to compare Judge Ed Carnes to
Justice Scalia."); Posting of Julie Kay to Southern District of Florida Blog, http://
sdfla.blogspot.com/2009 02_01_archive.html (Feb. 6, 2009, 12:21 EST) (In reference to the
Eleventh Circuit's Vamos a Cuba ruling, questioning "Are you surprised by the 1lth Circuit's
ruling authored by Judge Ed Carnes?").
366. Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1207.
367. Id. at 1200.
368. Id. at 1202.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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board merely pretextual after-the-fact justifications for eradicating mate-
rial deemed offensive and distasteful by a segment of the community?
Hinging the ruling on his findings of "various degrees of serious
distortions,' 37 ' and the "need for accuracy in factual information" to be
"especially true and of utmost importance for five to seven year-
olds, 3 72 Judge Cares determined that "it simply is not true, as Vamos a
Cuba asserts, that the lives of children in Cuba are like those of children
in this country, 3 73 and as such, the "Board's motive was what it
stated-that the book was ordered removed from school libraries
because it is full of factual errors. ' 374 The court further supported its
opinion by emphasizing (1) the "consistency throughout the process of
the inaccuracy complaints and . . . of the explanations of the Board
members who voted to remove the book; '375 (2) the fact that the
"Board's formal order stated Vamos a Cuba was being removed because
the Board had found that 'the book is inaccurate and contains several
omissions;' ,,376 and (3) that "five of the six [Board] members voting to
remove it explained that they were doing so because of inaccuracies. 377
As to the protestation over the educational suitability of the omitted
material for children, the Eleventh Circuit, referring to watered-down
statements of hardship in other books in the series, contended that "if it
is developmentally appropriate to tell children in this country about
some of the hardships that children face in India and in Cambodia, it is
no less developmentally appropriate to mention some of those that chil-
371. Id. at 1209. One of the "serious" distortions cited by Carnes includes:
[T]he book states that: "[m]any kinds of fruits grow in Cuba," and that "[b]ananas,
pineapples, orange, and mangoes are favorites." While these fruits are indeed grown
in Cuban and may be favorites, the implication that Cubans get to enjoy them is
misleading. The population generally does not have free access to them because
most of the fruit that is produced is exported, and the fruit that is not shipped out of
the country is rationed by the government. The evidence in the record indicates that
malnutrition is not uncommon among the children of Cuba. They do not eat like the
children of this country do.
Id. at 1212 (second and third alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). Another
inaccuracy by omission consisted of:
According to page 22 of Vamos a Cuba, "Cuban children go to school between the
ages of five and fourteen." That is not completely true. The record in this case
establishes that some children go to school beyond the age of fourteen, but only if
the student does not have "a 'political stain,"' the absence of which "is crucial to
have access to the university level, since 'the universities are for the
revolutionaries."'
Id. at 1213 (internal citations omitted).
372. Id. at 1215.
373. Id. at 1214.
374. Id. at 1211.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1209.
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dren face in Cuba." '378 Finally, chastising Judge Gold's ruling, Circuit
Court Judge Carnes asserted that "the district court's reasoning is
flawed. It never comes to grips with the substance of the School Board's
position, which is that representations made in Vamos a Cuba falsely
portray a life in Cuba that does not exist and that in reality life under the
Castro regime is bad-really bad."37 9
While evidence may sometimes be like beauty-both in the eye of
the beholder-Circuit Judge Wilson accurately points out in his dissent
that "here, the majority ignores certain evidence in order to reach its
decision. Instead of considering all the evidence in the record, as the
district court did, the majority ignores various statements made by
School Board members which suggest and sometimes even admit imper-
missible motives in the removal decision."380 Moreover, because the dis-
trict court was not faced with a "trial on the merits but ... instead a
preliminary injunction hearing, the credible and persuasive evidence was
sufficient for the district court to have found a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits. '381 Admitting that the book did contain some
inaccuracies, Judge Wilson discerned that "many of the inaccuracies
complained of are inconsequential, which casts doubt on whether those
proffered motivations for the book's removal are worthy of
credence." '382 Given expert testimony indicating that when it comes to
potentially inappropriate information, "it is better to err on the side of
caution in a young children's book," '3 83 and the fact that "without some
common ground it is difficult for a child to learn about what would
378. Id. at 1227. The passages to which the court refers are the following: (1) "The book A
Visit to Cambodia tells its audience: 'Not all young people can go to school. There has been war
in Cambodia for more than 20 years. Many schools have been destroyed."' Id. at 1217; (2) "A
Visit to India informs children: 'Many children are too poor to go to school. Their families need
them to stay at home. The children help farm or they beg in the streets.'" Id.
379. Id. at 1221.
380. Id. at 1233 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1248. Judge Wilson proceeds to detail one such example of this:
For example, one of the "inaccuracies" is that the book explained that Cuban music
is played with maracas made of pumpkins. Dr. Clark [defendants' expert] objected:
"To say that maracas are made of pumpkins shows the utter ignorance of the writer
on this matter. The maracas are made from the guiro fruit, dried and properly
processed." Yet, according to the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, the
guiro fruit in fact is a pumpkin. It is a type of gourd, which are in the same family as
pumpkins. While it may have been more precise for the book to say that maracas are
made from a guiro fruit or a gourd, it borders on frivolity to argue about whether a
maraca is made from a pumpkin. Moreover, it is evident that explaining that a
maraca is made from a guiro fruit will mean far less to an American four-year-old
than explaining that it is made from a pumpkin, with which Halloween has rendered
the four-year-old familiar.
Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting) (internal footnote and citations omitted).
383. Id. at 1246.
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otherwise seem to foreign, 384 Wilson reasoned that "such generaliza-
tions do not render a book inaccurate so much as they simplistically
illustrate Cuba's culture." '385 He also addressed the arguments made
regarding the Cambodia and India books, and asserted that "negative
information is in fact included in Vamos a Cuba":38 6 For example, "the
pictures depict Cuba as a poor country, with children missing articles of
clothing (on page 10 a young boy is shirtless and on page 19 a boy is
shirtless and shoeless), people engaged in manual labor, children also
engaged in such labor, and outdated housing and cars. ' 387 After review
of the evidence and the district court's opinion, Wilson opined that there
were "numerous statements that demonstrate that other motivations were
at work, ' 388 and concluded that "the greater weight of the record evi-
dence supports the district court's finding that the School Board acted in
a narrowly partisan, political manner in furtherance of ideological view-
points, in a way that the First Amendment forbids, when it voted to
remove Vamos a Cuba from its library shelves. 389
Aside from the shortcomings identified by Wilson, the majority's
opinion fails to engage in critical thought and examination of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the case in other ways. For instance, Judge
Carnes boasts of the board's "consistency"3 90 in its focus on accuracy
throughout the entire process; however, it appears the only consistent
focus on the Miami-Dade School Board's agenda was eradicating
iVamos a Cuba!, not only from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Elemen-
tary School, but from every elementary school in the entire district, at all
costs and without regard to procedure, ethical discretion, or the Constitu-
tion. This is most prominently evidenced by the school board's hijacking
of the review process after the SMRC voted seven-to-one to retain the
book 39 -an event conveniently overlooked in Judge Carnes's opinion.
Also overlooked is the fact that in this unwarranted intervention, the
board members exhibited very personal and political feelings toward the
book and demanded its immediate removal, in knowing violation of
appropriate procedure, from the entire district.3 92 The board backed
down, allowing fair procedure to run its course, only after its attorney
384. Id. at 1249.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1247 (emphasis added).
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1237.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 1211 (majority opinion).
391. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Sch. Bd. (Vamos a Cuba), 439 F.
Supp. 2d 1242, 1251-52 (S.D. Fla. 2006). See also supra Part [V.A.
392. Vamos a Cuba, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1251-52.
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strongly warned that such action would inevitably impel a lawsuit. 393
The Eleventh Circuit then promulgates as convincing evidence the
declaration in the school board's final order that the books were
removed for inaccuracies and omissions.39 4 Not only is this proclama-
tion unconvincing in light of the board members' intensely personal and
political comments made during the decision,3 95 but it is also dubious in
consideration of the fact that the issuance of the order was practically
coached by the board's attorney to avoid potential lawsuits.39 6 Forecast-
ing another board hiccup subjecting itself to liability, the school's coun-
sel issued another warning memorandum just prior to the board's final
review, advising that:
The Board should be careful to state its legitimate, constitutionally-
sound reasons for its decisions and the reasons for deviation from the
... recommendations .... The Board's decision should be memorial-
ized in a formal order . . . . The order should contain the Board's
findings and conclusions showing the rationale for the Board's deci-
sion .... [I]t is our opinion that deviation from the DMRC's deci-
sion, especially in light of the extensive analysis and deliberation...
would most likely subject such a decision by the Board to a legal
challenge .... [I]t is exceedingly important that the Board identify
with specificity the legal grounds for any Board decisions, particu-
larly one that deviates from the DMRC's recommendations. Moreo-
ver, it is our opinion that even a well reasoned decision by the Board
that deviates ... will expose the Board to liability.397
Given such explicit directions, it is difficult to see how the board could
issue a final order stating anything other than its best possible shot at
insulating itself from legal action.
Judge Carnes also notes that "five of the six [board] members vot-
ing to remove it [the book] explained that they were doing so because of
inaccuracies. ' 398 Again the opinion-delivering judge-aside from ignor-
ing the overwhelming amount of non-accuracy related comments-fails
to contextualize this with crucial evidence: While six of the board mem-
bers may have (for argument's sake) legitimately believed the books
were inaccurate and such defaults rendered them unsuitable for the pub-
lic-school library, twenty-six399 other committee members (including the
superintendent and dissenting board members) found, after extensive
research and debate, that the books met educational criteria, were "valu-
393. Id. at 1252.
394. Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1211.
395. Vamos a Cuba, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-60.
396. Id. at 1256-57.
397. Id.
398. Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1209.
399. Vamos a Cuba, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1251, 1256, 1258.
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able to an individual course of study," 4°° and should be retained in the
school district's libraries with no restrictions.40' Judge Carnes, therefore,
is correct in observing that the reasoning given by these six members
suggests they remained true to one intent throughout the process; that
intent, however, was to radically thwart the school's system of fair pro-
cedure and unilaterally expunge the district of a children's simple pic-
ture book based on personal opinions and political viewpoint. Such an
agenda-convincing cover story or not-is forbidden by the First
Amendment.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit alleges that the district court, in its
ruling, "never comes to grips with the substance of the School Board's
position . . . that in reality life under the Castro regime is bad-really
bad."4 2 Although Judge Wilson makes a salient counterargument, aver-
ring that "recognizing that life in Cuba is oppressive does not justify
constitutionally impermissible viewpoint discrimination,"4 3 the ironic
reality is that the Eleventh Circuit, itself, failed to come to grips with
substantial points of the plaintiffs' position. Debatable inaccuracies
admitted, the court seems to forget that the case concerns library books,
books that by their very nature are inherently voluntary, and courts
across the country and in the Eleventh Circuit have recognized them to
be distinguishably so.4 04 While of course accuracy may be one of many
concerns in the selection and retention of library books, the small, and in
some examples, validated, omissions lamented by the board in iVamos a
Cuba! "fall[ ] outside the scope of a superficial geography book."40 5 As
Miami journalist Michael Putney points out:
Vamos a Cuba, like all the other books in the series, is simply meant
to give small children a sense of what it's like to be a child in another
country. One page in Vamos a Cuba shows a shirtless and shoeless
little boy leading a team of oxen to a farm field. Should the text say
it's a state-owned collective? I don't think so, although a knowledge-
able parent could tell his child that. Assuming a 6-year-old would
care.
40 6
400. Id. at 1254.
401. Id. at 1256.
402. Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1221.
403. Id. at 1237 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
404. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
861-62 (1982) ("[A]s this case is presented to us, it does not involve textbooks, or indeed any
books that Island Trees students would be required to read .... [T]he only books at issue in this
case are library books, books that by their nature are optional rather than required reading."); see
also Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia County, Fla., 862 F.2d 1517, 1523 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989)
(declining to apply Pico because the books at issue were not books of voluntary inquiry in the
library and because the parties stipulated no impermissible motive to be at issue).
405. Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1247 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
406. Putney, supra note 359.
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The book's purpose is to provide "a simple glimpse into Cuba
which will form the basis of a future, deeper understanding about the
country," and, as Judge Wilson directs, "the answer to books that do not
provide all the information a reader wants is to find another book.""' 7
Furthermore, should parents not want their children to be exposed to
such a minimalist representation of Cuban culture, the answer is also
simple: "Don't like the book? Don't check it out. That's a choice
unavailable to people in Cuba. 40 8
Most importantly, the Eleventh Circuit's ruling fails to come to
terms with the dangerously imprudent precedent it sets by reversing the
lower court's decision. The court's holding invites not only a tidal wave
of frivolous book challenges and litigation based on its narrow interpre-
tation of the degree of "accuracy" required to pass muster in public ele-
mentary school libraries,4 °9 but also tells school board officials that they
may recklessly rob students of their constitutional rights, for any rea-
son-personal, political, or otherwise-so long as they advance a quasi-
legitimate post hoc excuse when confronted about their impermissible
actions. The intimation of such unbridled discretion by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals perilously perverts the spirit of Pico's First
Amendment protections and converts courts across Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia into venues for pretextual puppet shows.
In response to the Eleventh Circuit's constitutionally repugnant
reversal, Howard Simon, Executive Director of the ACLU of Florida,
stated, "[C]learly this cannot be allowed to stand. We must take further
action."4 0 What action exactly, the ACLU has not yet said, but Simon
assured that the organization "will move forward to protect free speech
in America's public schools through one of the multiple legal options
that are available," '' and that no matter how much the school board and
Eleventh Circuit judges "try to evade the facts and bend the law into a
pretzel, censorship is censorship is censorship."4 2 Will Vamos a Cuba
visit the Supreme Court? Will the Justices agree? Stay tuned.
407. Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1248 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
408. Putney, supra note 359.
409. See, e.g., Vamos a Cuba, 557 F.3d at 1249 (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("For example, a
reference book for children about cars and trucks would be 'inaccurate' without information about
how their emissions contribute to global warming.").
410. Kathleen McGregory & Jay Weaver, Yanking Book on Cuba Ruled Legal by Court,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2009, at IA.
411. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Fla., 11 th Circuit Decision Flies in the
Face of First Amendment (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.aclufl.orglnewsevents/index.
cfm?action=viewRelease&emailAlertlD=3697.
412. McGregory & Weaver, supra note 410.
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